

Unit One

What is World History?

To put it simply, world history is the story of connections within the global human community. The world Historian's work is to portray the crossing of boundaries and the linking of systems in the human past. The source material ranges in scale from individual family tales to migrations of peoples to narratives encompassing all humanity. World history is far less than the sum total of all history. Nevertheless, it adds to our accumulated knowledge of the past through its focus on connections among historical localities, time periods, and themes of study.

World history is new to most historians. Since it is not a small or simple terrain, the question "What is world history?" gets asked repeatedly. Some may pose the question out of suspicion or even hostility, but most who ask simply want to get beyond a vague sense of a field dealing with large expanses of time and space. They also want to learn a more specific way of dealing with immense topics in an orderly fashion. Defining world history requires clarifying such terms as *connections* and human *community*, and addresses the dilemma of depth and span in analyzing the past.

The study of world history has formed in part out of new ways of looking at the established materials of history, particularly in politics, trade, and culture. Historians have known for hundreds of years about the near-simultaneous rise of great empires around the world in the sixteenth century and about the global flow of silver in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But only recently have historians sought to understand connections among such events as the imperial expansions of Habsburg Spain, Mughal India, and Russia. Only recently have scholars systematically traced silver flows from mines in Peru, Mexico, and Japan to markets in Europe, South Asia, and especially China. In this work, historians have found that some historical patterns can be explained better through global linkages than through localized case studies. Expanding the scale of analysis helps locate interconnections that explain the patterns. This path takes an "internal" route to world history.

The other path to world history is "external." This one involves the emergence of immense quantities of new information about change over time from outside the traditional bounds of history. For example, in recent decades we have learned much about environmental changes, the history of disease, and the stages of human evolution. The Disciplines of linguistics, archaeology, and chemistry have revealed important historical information. As this information has worked its way into history, the boundaries of historical studies have expanded. Environmental scientists began giving historical interpretation to their findings, and some historians responded by studying changes in the environment. As specialists in various fields have developed global insights into change over time, their work has been instrumental in fostering the incorporation of previously excluded fields of study into history.

The events and thought involved in each of the two expanding channels to world history- the internal historians' path and the external scientific-cultural path-have helped fuel the growth and define the character of world history. Historians now examine old and new topics, using old and new approaches to discover many new patterns in the past. "History," as a result, now addresses a wider range of areas, a longer time period, and a greater range of topics than ever before. At the same time, the patterns now being uncovered in our past help make sense of the enormous amount of new evidence.

Along the internal path-that is, within the traditional arena of historical studies-the history of slavery, freedom, and racial discrimination in the Atlantic world provides an instructive example of world historical connections. Over the years, writers in the United States developed a national history of the slavery experience. So had historians in Brazil, the British West Indies, and other areas. In each case, scholars sought to explain slavery, abolition, and racial discrimination within the boundaries of a single national territory or imperial system. But when a view of slavery from a world historical perspective arose, particularly through the study of slave trade volume and

distribution, a series of new lessons emerged. The United States, for all the importance of slavery there, received just over 5 percent of the captives brought across the Atlantic. Racial discrimination developed not in a single place and time, but evolved out of interplay all around the Atlantic. Just when Jim Crow laws emerged in the wake of the U.S. Civil War, racial polarization emerged in other societies where slaves gained their freedom. In Jamaica, for instance, the efforts of ex-slaves to buy land brought a vicious repression in the Morant Bay events of 1865; thereafter the British eliminated representative government and replaced it with Crown Colony rule. The US. And British experiences thus had remarkable parallels.

This same connected logic of world history has also led historians of slavery to examine the place of African societies in the worldwide system of slavery and its consequences. Indeed, the racial polarization of the Americas in the late nineteenth century was also felt in Africa. For instance, Samuel Crowther, the Nigerian-born ex-slave who rose to be the first Anglican bishop of West Africa, lost his position in 1890 through the action of younger, white clerics. After being ruled by the Portuguese for over three hundred years, Angola experienced sudden changes at the end of the nineteenth century that brought residential segregation to the capital city of Luanda and removed blacks from positions of influence in the colonial administration. In French-ruled Senegal, an outbreak of bubonic plague at the turn of the twentieth century prompted residential segregation in the growing port town of Dakar?

In sum, the rise of racial discrimination and racial segregation that began in the 1890s all around the Atlantic in apparently independent situations suggests that some underlying common cause affected all these situations. A regional or national narrative does not explain the global timing of events.

Similarly, the old stories about the history of industrialization tend to change when the topic is viewed as world history. The English spinners and weavers of wool and cotton retain their place, along with the entrepreneurs who organized the division of labor in early pin factories. Yet they must share their pages in the history of industrialization with the entrepreneurs and workers who mechanized sugar production in the Americas, and with cotton producers in the United States, India, Brazil, and Egypt. The established story of the evolution of European social structure, with its transformation through the rise of a class of wage Workers, must now make room for the emerging stories of work forces and the industrial revolution overseas. In the Americas, both free and slave labor forces expanded; in Africa, the population declined but slave labor expanded; and in India, the handloom textile industry was crippled by mechanization. Industrialization, we can now see, has been a global phenomenon since its earliest stages.

World history also addresses past connections in areas new to the work of historians. One example of change along this second, scientific-cultural path to world history involves the histories of agriculture and disease, Jared Diamond, a physiologist by training, did much to clarify this linkage. Diamond summarized available archaeological and botanical information on the main centers of agricultural innovation: the Fertile Crescent, China, North and South America, West Africa, Ethiopia, and New Guinea. Each of these agricultural expansions, beginning some ten thousand years ago, led to denser populations. They also led to the development of new infectious diseases. Diamond also noted that in Eurasia, the domestication of large animals led sharing of diseases among humans and their animals. As a result, the populations of Eurasia (and Africa) not only were dense but also carried microbes and immunities for a wide range of diseases. By contrast, in the Americas, Australia, and the Pacific, Large animals had been eliminated for the most part by the sudden appearance of *Homo sapiens* from ten to sixty thousand years ago, so that few remained (llamas are one exception) for domestication. From the sixteenth century, contact between Eurasian populations and those elsewhere resulted, therefore, in horrendous mortality rates in the regions previously lacking large animals.

In each of these cases, a world historian looking further afield brought another story into focus, World history, in other words, expands the study of traditional topics in history. It also broadens the scope of historical study to include a range of issues regarding the past first germinated in other disciplines. World history has gained more prominence and practice now

because of the great expansion of historical data, the expanded range of issues to be addressed, and the greater attention being given to interconnections in historical processes. At the most expansive level, I could claim that all historical studies have now become world history, since all historians are now expected to pay attention to interdisciplinary approaches and historical connections. On a more modest and practical plane I define world history as a field of study focusing on the historical connections among entities and systems often thought to be distant.

Historians are those who assemble knowledge about the community. They have been active in almost every society, small or large. In part out of long practice and in part to sustain themselves, historians have honed the art of collecting information and presenting it in ways tailored specifically to the interests of their audiences. Over the centuries, the works of good historians continue to be read because human communities reproduce common patterns of behavior. For example, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Sima Qian, the early giants of written history, wrote analyses of personal characteristics and social situations that still ring true today. In general, the tales of individual ambitions and group interactions preserve much that is similar over the eons. Even so, there are distinct genres of history that relate specifically to particular audiences, and there have been times when history has changed in response to new knowledge and new ways of organizing and prioritizing knowledge. In fact the list of genres and audiences is rather long.

Out of the family came *genealogy*, from the begetting of the Bible to the family tree of lineages both humble and lordly. Out of the village came the *local history*, tales of key local events that included biographies of outstanding local figures. From the traveler and compiler came *geography*, which accounted for distant lands and peoples. From the dynasty came the *dynastic chronology* of priests accounted for the relations of man and God over time. From these groupings emerged various themes in history: the dynasty created *cultural history*, based on the work of palace poets and sculptors, but so did the masses, based on village songs and dances. Philosophers produced reasoned histories of the world that struggled with the question of where it had come from and where it was going. All these types of history were born out of their various social settings, and these locales continue to produce new histories for their audiences. The genealogies and local histories were parochial, while the geographies and universal histories were cosmopolitan. All were about the world, but more importantly, all were about different portions of it.

These histories maintained their discrete character. They also became intertwined, in the hands of good storytellers, into myths combining such elements as genealogy, biography, dynastic chronology, geography, and universal history. Oral histories survived in detail for several generations and then were lost or transformed, yet their basic social message (for example, the truism behind a fable or parable) often survived much longer. Written histories could be passed on with greater precision. Such languages as Chinese, Greek, Latin, Persian, Arabic, and Sanskrit have sustained long traditions of historical interpretation, and out of these written traditions came *civilizational* histories.

World history too persisted through all these times, in the minds of those few who strained vigorously against the limits on their knowledge of past and present. World history emerged from the dreams of prophets, generals, emperors, and perhaps also inventors, as they strove to explore and master the furthest dimensions of their environments and the forces at work within them. Many people might have been interested in the world, its meaning, and its fate, but only a few were interested in the world, its meaning, and its fate, but only a few were interested in world history. Nevertheless, the tiny, tenuously connected series of world historians persevered, developing their interpretations step by step.

Each of the major written languages preserves contributions to the understanding of world history, but those writing in the modern European languages took the lead in creating the modern vision of world history. Among European writers, studies on the history of the ancient world developed out of the tradition of classical studies that began in the Renaissance and thrived thereafter. Parallel studies of the history of Christianity and of medieval Europe were gradually

drawn into these classical studies and included in the analysis of politics elite culture, and ideas. During the nineteenth century, studies of world history in early times broadened fundamentally as new fields of study emerged especially archaeology, linguistics, Orientalism, and Sinology.

The frameworks and the questions of scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries continue to dominate the study of world history in early times. This work is centered on “civilization” – the emergence of civilization, the course of civilizational histories, and interactions among civilizations. This focus on large states and on world religions means that the literature on early world history tended to neglect peoples outside the bounds of “civilization.”

For the world history of times since about 1500, the framework of analysis was formed out of each era’s social analysis. Enlightenment scholars debated whether the Renaissance or the Reformation was key to the rise of modern society. Political history centered on the competition of states for hegemony and on the development of political theory harking back to Plato but focusing mainly on Locke and Montesquieu. In economic history, some visions of modern world history have developed out of studies of world trade and industrialization. A number of interpretations of modern world history, for instance, have focused on Europe’s role in creating a global community, on the process of incorporating various regions into that community, and ultimately on the global hegemony of Western Civilization. All these patterns of world historical thinking settled into place during the nineteenth century- in other words, before the grand syntheses of Spengler, Wells, and Toynbee and long before world history became a field of widespread interest.

Then in the nineteenth century, came the nation. The ascendancy and resilience of the nation as the primary form of political and social organization during the past two centuries changed the nature of history. This marked above all a new definition of community. The leaders of emerging national communities and polities redefined and reaffirmed the priority of political history, directing historians to tell the tale of each nation’s emergence and claim to destiny. Historians specialized in the study of state archives to the exclusion most other sources. They developed national specializations and doctoral programs. They also formed professional associations such as the American Historical Association (founded in 1884). These national historians stigmatized historians outside the university and the discipline as amateurs. They treated local historians as regional chauvinists and world historians as philosophical gadflies. At the same time, these historians documented their claims of national destiny with clear references to each nation’s place in the developing global community.

In the twentieth century, changing priorities within the nation created a need for a *social history* to recount the story of groups struggling for position in the national society. Social history helped bring social peace. With it, national history expanded to accommodate various ethnic and religious groups, laborers and entrepreneurs, and women and men, but this wider range of interaction remained firmly bound within the national borders. Here again, historians relied heavily on government documents to study social history. (This social history, indirectly and after a time, became linked to the expansion of world history).

Thus, for most of the time between 1850 and 2000, the most prestigious history was the study of national states. Studies of ancient history were labeled as “Classics” or “archaeology” and set outside of history; studies of medieval history were left in limbo or treated as preconditions for modern nations. The national historians raised their study to an unprecedented level of skill and precision but at the cost of an extreme narrowing of their field and a neglect of most other types of history.

World history continued to develop in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it grew as a marginal field. As the discipline of professional history developed in the expanding universities, none of its professorships, scholarly journals, study programs, or prizes went to world history. World history was still considered an amateur pursuit. Yet the discussion and interpretation of global connections continued quietly, as it had earlier centuries. As a result, when world history underwent its great expansion in the late twentieth century, it was not invented *de novo* but rather continued to expand along the lines of its previous development.

Unit Two

Iran in History (Part I)

The history of Persia is marked by a number of breaks in political continuity. The most significant is perhaps, the Islamic conquest, which brought Persia's existence as an independent state to a temporary end. She did not become an independent political unit again until Safavid times. During the intervening period she formed part of the Umayyad and then the 'Abbasid caliphate, and when that fragmented, after the period of the minor dynasties, she became the center of successively the Great Seljuk, Tikhani, and Timurid empires, the frontiers of which extended beyond the geographical frontiers of Persia. The Arab conquest swept away the political framework of the Sasanian empire. The ruling family, the territorial princes and feudal magnates disappeared, and the power of the Zoroastrian clergy, which had been closely associated with the Sasanian empire, was broken. Nevertheless, the new civilization which grew up in the eastern provinces of the caliphate owed much to Sasanian Persia and the Persians played an important part in its development. There was, indeed, a two-fold movement of change, which took some time to work out. On the one hand Islamic theory reacted upon and influenced the development of Persian political, social, and economic institutions, while on the other hand Islamic theory was itself in part moulded and modified by the institutions and attitudes of mind which prevailed in Persia.

When the prophet Muhammad was born the Sasanian empire under Anushirwan (A.D. 531-79) had every appearance of strength, but it no longer preserved its original form. Consequent upon the suppression of the revolt of Mazdak it had become a military despotism. The social discontent manifested by that revolt had been suppressed but not allayed. The prolonged wars with Rome and incursions by nomads from central Asia had greatly weakened it. The rule of the later Sasanian monarchs was marked by anarchy and the persecution of Christian, Jewish, and Sabeian minorities. The disappearance of the Lakhmids, a dynasty of Southern Arabian origin who were Persian vassals, moreover, left the western border of the Persian empire unprotected. The conquest of Persia was undertaken mainly from the garrison cities of Basra and Kufa. The area to the north of Nihavand, taken by the Kufans, was known as Mah Kufa, while the territory further south round Dinavar was taken by their Basran rivals and known as Mah Basra. The Occupation of Khuzistan (17/638-21/642) was organized by the governor of Basra, Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, who also took part in the conquest of Mesopotamia (18/639-20/641). Expeditions also set out towards Adharbaydjan from Mawsil. Ardabil capitulated about 20/641. The final defeat of the Persian army took place at Nihavand in 21/642. Hamadan made peace and further conquests were made in the direction of Adharbaydjan (variously recorded under the years 18/639-22/643). Expeditions were also sent against Kazwin, Abhar, and Zandjan, and efforts made to take Daylam and Gilan. Hamadan appears to have broken the terms of the peace, for it is recorded as being stormed in 24/645. Rayy and Kumis fell also about 24/644-5.

After the defeat of the Persian army at Dialula, 'Umar was faced with the problem of the administration of the conquests in the Sawad. He could not conclude treaties as Khalid had done, because large areas had been abandoned by the ruling classes and had remained without a government. He therefore decided to immobilize the land and to levy land and poll taxes on the inhabitants, the revenue therefrom to be pay for the Muslim warriors and those who came after them. In the name of the Muslim state, he assumed full ownership of the estates and villages which had formerly belonged to the Sasanian royal family and the nobility who had been killed or fled, leaving the peasants on the land, and of deserted and "dead" lands. This assumption of ownership carried with it the right to cultivate the lands for the state, give them away, sell them, or grant them as assignments, and to impose on the holders kharadi or ushr.

The circumstances of conquest varied in different provinces and from this stemmed differences in the tax administration. Towns which did not capitulate before conquest, but asked for an armistice after resistance had seemed hopeless, were required to pay a poll-tax in money and a contribution in kind, which could be increased or decreased as the population changed. The land, having been taken by force, was placed at the disposal of the imam, but in contradistinction to land

which had capitulated before conquest (ahd land) the terms of the agreement (sulh) could be changed. Sulh and 'ahd lands had their own local administration, whereas kharadj lands were closely regulated by the Arab diwans. (For a discussion of these problems see D. C. Dennett, conversion and the poll tax in early Islam, Harvard University press and Oxford University press, 1950).

Although Yazdigird's supporters were still active in northern Fars, organized resistance ceased with the defeats suffered by the royal army. Some local communities and marzbans with their troops continued to resist. Others concluded treaties with the Arabs on their own account. Many of the Persian captives became mawal and some of Yazdigird's army joined the Arabs. About 23/643 'Uthman b. 'I-'As Thakafi made advances into southern Fars from Bahrayn, supported by Abu Musa from Basra. Tawwadi fell and raids were made on other towns in Fars. Further advances were made during the caliphate of 'Uthman and between 25/644 and 27/647-8 'Abd Allah b. 'Amir, who had been appointed governor of Basra, took Arradian, Shahpur, Shiraz, Siniz, Darabjird, and Fasa. Istakhr fell in 28/648-9 and Gur (Firuzabad) shortly afterwards. In the following year 'Abd Allah set out for afterwards. In the following year 'Abd Allah set out for Khurasan. Yazdigird, pursued by a Muslim force, had meanwhile fled via Kirman to Marv. Sirdjan, Bam, and Djiruft were conquered, and Hurmuz fell in 30/650-I. Skirmishes with the inhabitants of the mountain diatrics of Kirman continued for many years.

From Kirman the Arabs under Rabi' b. Ziyad al-Harithi pushed north-eastwards into Sistan. His successor was expelled from the country, but another expedition was sent by 'Abd Allah b. 'Amir under 'Abd al-Rahman b. Samura, who penetrated to Zamin Dawar, Bust, and Zabut. 'Abd Allah had meanwhile reached Tabasayn and sent Ahnaf b. Kays to take Kuhistan, whence he pressed on to Marv, which surrendered. Yazdigird fled to Balkhand over the Oxus to Tirmidh. In 31/651-2 he was murdered in flight near Murghab. The Muslims under Ahnaf took Dguzdian and Balkh and advanced to Khwarazm. 'Abd Allah had meanwhile set out for Nishapur, which surrendered. Bayhak, Nisa, and Sarakhs also fell. Another group went to Harat (32/653). 'Abd Allah then returned, leaving Kays b. al-Haytham as governor of Khurasan.

'Uthman died in 35/656. The conquests in Persia were not yet secure, and during the civil war the Arab advance was stayed. In Khurasan fighting broke out between Muder and Rabi' a. The disorders spread throughout the province and enabled the Transoxanian leaders to regain their independence which had been on the point of being extinguished. Balkh for a brief period fell under Chinese control. Numerous outbreaks of resistance also occurred in other parts of Persia. In 42/662 Mu'awiyah reappointed 'Abd Allah b. 'Amir governor of Basra and the east. He sent 'Abd al-Rahman b. Samura to restore Arab rule in Sistan and Khurasan. Balkh was reconquered in 43/663 Sistan recaptured and Kabul taken. The reconquest of Khurasan begun by Kays b. al-Haytham, was continued under Ziyad b. 'Abi Sufyan, who established a strong Arab garrison in Marv and shortly afterwards settled 50,000 Arab colonists in Khurasan. Bukhara was captured in 54/674 and Samarkand fell in 56/676.

A new period was now beginning in the history of Persia. By this time she had been fully incorporated into the Islamic world. The Arab settlers had been largely assimilated to the local population. Conversion had proceeded throughout the country, though Zoroastrianism was still, to some extent, tolerated. The former ruling classes, so far as they had survived, had converted to Sunni Islam, as too had the mass of the people, though there were enclaves of Shi'ism from an early period in some districts, notably Kumm, Ahwaz, Kashan, Rayy, and Sava. As the central government in Baghdad declined old political and social tendencies began to reassert themselves more strongly and new centers of power began to emerge.

In the field of political thought, there was a strong continuity. The Sasanian concept of the universal empire was greatly strengthened under the 'Abbasids. The caliph came to be regarded as the shadow of God upon earth (though the strictly orthodox never accepted this view). In the course of time this concept was transferred to the temporal rulers, with consequences detrimental to the freedom and dignity of the subject. Similarly, the imam's rights in regard to the ownership of land passed tacitly to the temporal rulers, and his power to delegate authority. Other Sasanian

concepts, such as the identification of the state with the social order and the hierarchical nature of society, also came to be increasingly accepted. Din and dawla were two sides political opposition were inseparable. Hostile movements against and the ruling classes thus tended to manifest themselves under the guise of shi'ism .

Most of the dynasties which arose as the caliphate fragmented came to power within the general political framework of the Muslim world and accepted the prevailing administrative traditions and political concepts, or if they did not before their assumption of power, they rapidly conformed once they had seized power- as in the case of the 'Abbasids, who quickly abandoned any extremist tendencies they may have entertained before their victory over the Umayyads. There was, it is true, alongside the "conservative" tendency of society and government a messianic tendency, but its manifestations were usually fleeting. Its most striking expression in 'Abbasid times was the Ismaili movement, which at one time threatened the existence of the Great Saldjuk empire and was only finally extinguished as a political movement by Hulagu. Broadly speaking, however, the rise of new dynasties did not materially alter the structure of society , but merely the composition of the ruling class and , sometimes , the relative importance of the different classes. From Saldjuk times onwards the balance between the settled and semi-settled elements of the population was a delicate one . After the Mongol invasion there was a wide spread expansion of nomadism accompanied by a dislocation of rural and urban life.

The Caspian provinces with their forests and mountain valleys and difficult communications proved hard to conquer. During the early Islamic period Kazvin remained a frontier district. From the reign of 'Umar to that of al-Ma'mun, seventeen expeditions are recorded against Daylam. From about 250/864 the mountain fastnesses of Daylam served as a refuge for the 'Alids against the 'Abbasids, where they formed a new center of resistance hostile to both Baghdad and Khurasan, the governors of which sought to extend their dominion over the Caspian provinces conversion in the Caspian provinces had been slow. In 259/873 a large number of Zoroastrians were converted by Nasir al-Hakk Abu Muhammad in Daylam, and in 299/912 Hasan b. Ali is said to have converted the inhabitants of Tabaristan and Daylam, who were still partly idolators and partly Magians, to Islam (Mas 'udi, viii, 279). Many of the movements which originated in the Caspian provinces were characterized by Shi ' i movement tended to be associated with social movement and to draw into its ranks the discontented.

In the second half of the 9th/15th century Adhar-baydjan became the center of the rising Safavid power, and Tabriz became the capital in the early years of the 10th/16th century. Just as the Saldjuks moved their capitals westwards from Khurasan to the center of Persia, so also the Safavids moved progressively eastwards, from Tabriz to Kazvin and Esfahan. In the 19th century Adharbaydjan, with the advance of Russia through the Caucasus and Khurasan as crucial frontier area . Here , too, the frontier eventually established after Persia's defeat by Russia in 1828 was considerably inside the mediaeval border.

The period from the death of al-Mamun up to the Mongol invasion falls into three periods, those of the minor dynasties, the Great Saldjuk empire(447/1055-552/1157), and the Khwarazmshahs, ending with the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 656/1258. During the first of these , the western provinces dominated by Baghdad developed along rather different lines from Khurasan and the east , although there was a certain influence of the one on the other. This was partly because of the differences in society in the two areas and partly because of differences in political development. Baghdad and the neighbourhood had experienced all the vicissitudes of the political and economic decline of the caliphate after the death of al- Ma mun. In Khurasan, on the other hand, the old structure of society had maintained itself to a greater extent; the local ruling families still retained a good deal of their former influence and there was a rich merchant class engaged in the caravan trade with China and other countries. On the other side of the frontier there were still a number of independent principalities, often at war with each other. Under the Tahirids, who came to power in the east, and their successors the Samanids, there was a reassertion of old social tendencies, whereas under the Buyids, society was in an advanced stage of disintegration. The Ghaznavids, the successors of the Samanids, were in due course overthrown by the Saldjuks,

under whom the lands of the eastern caliphate were integrated and a new system of government worked out, combining features found in both the eastern and western provinces in a new symbiosis.

The establishment of a strong central government provided order and discipline, secured the defence of the Muslim community and Muslim lands, and created conditions in which Muslim life could be lived and the various classes carry on their occupations in relative security. But it failed to remove the underlying dissatisfactions, and the Saljuk period is also marked by the appearance of a new phase of the Ismaili movement, known to Arab historians as the “new propaganda” (*al-da wa al-diadida*) in contradistinction to the “old propaganda” (*al-da wa al-diadida*) of the Fatimids, and its followers as the Batiniyya.

Unit Three

Iran in History (Part II)

On Timur's death internecine strife broke out, from which two main kingdoms emerged. Miran Shah, the third son of Timur, and his sons Abu Bakr and Muhammad Umar, obtained western Persia, with their main centers at Tabriz and Baghdad, and Shahrukh, Timur's fourth son, Khurasan, to which he subsequently added Transoxania. The Timurid state in western Persia did not last long: the Jalairs recovered Baghdad and the Turkomans of the Black Sheep, whom Timur had driven out of Armenia, returned to that province and in 810-II / 1408 invaded Adharbaydjan and defeated Miran Shah near Tabriz. Two years later they took Baghdad from the Jalairs and found themselves masters of the western part of Timur's empire. The eastern branch ruled rather longer. Shahrukh (807 / 1404 – 850 / 1447) took Transoxania from one of his nephews and 'Irak-i 'Adjam and the devastating campaigns of Timur in Iran between 783 / 1381 – 807 / 1404 swept away the minor dynasties which had sprung up in various parts of the country after the Mongol invasions, and left a political and social vacuum from the Oxus to the Euphrates. In this vacuum, various rival forces fought for supremacy for nearly a century. The establishment of the Safawid dynasty in 907 / 1501 led to the re-integration of Iran and 'Irak-i 'Arab under one stable administration, certainly for the first time since the break-up of the Ilkhanid empire, ca. 736 / 1335, if one takes into consideration the important city of Harat, virtually for the first time since the invasions of Genghis Khan [q.v.].

At the time of death of Timur in 807 / 1405, his descendants found themselves in secure possession only of Khurasan and 'Irak-i 'Adjam, outside Transoxania itself. In the course of the next fifteen years, however, Shahrukh b. Timur successively annexed the provinces of Gurgan and Mazandaran (809 / 1406–7), Fars (817 / 1414–15), and Kirman (819 / 1416–17), and in 823 / 1420–1 felt strong enough to invade Adharbaydjan, which had passed into the hands of the Kara Koyunlu (Black Sheep) Turkomans.

The Kara Koyunlu group of nomadic Turkoman tribes, like their rivals the Ak Koyunlu (white sheep) Turkoman group, had settled in Seldjuk times in Armenia, upper Mesopotamia and Anatolia. In the second half of the 8th / 14th century, the Kara Koyunlu moved eastwards into north-west Iran, and established themselves in the region of Lake Van as vassals of the Jalairis [q.v.]. In about 792 / 1390 the Kara Koyunlu amir Kara Yusuf seized Tabriz and declared his independence of the Jalairid sultan. Both rulers were dispossessed by Timur, but regained control of Adharbaydjan and 'Arab respectively within a few years of the death of Timur.

In 905 / 1499 Ismail made his bid for power; by the autumn of 1500 he had been joined by 7,000 Kizilbash at his rendezvous at Erzindjan. He turned aside to crush the Shirwanshah, who had killed both his father and his grandfather, and then, at the battle of Sharur, he routed Alwand Ak Koyunlu. Ismail entered Tabriz (907 / 1501), had himself

Crowned as the first Shah of the Safawid dynasty, and proclaimed the Djafari rite of Ithna 'Ashari Shiism to be the official religion of the new Safawid state.

Shah Ismail died on 19 Rabi' al-Thani 930 / 23 May 1524, and was succeeded by his son Tahmasp, then ten and a half years of age. The extent to which the theocratic concept of the early Safawid state had broken down in practice was demonstrated by the ten years of civil war between rival Kizilbash factions which marked the beginning of his reign. The authority of the Shah was usurped by Kizilbash chiefs, who were the *de facto* rulers of the state during this period. In 940 / 1533–4, however, Shah Tahmasp made clear his intention to rule in fact and not in name only, and, for most of the remainder of his long reign of fifty-two years, he maintained a precarious ascendancy over the turbulent Kizilbash.

In 982 / 1574, Shah Tahmasp became seriously ill, and the Safawid state was once again involved in a crisis. As first, the dissensions which broke out among the Kizilbash appeared to be merely a recrudescence of the factional struggles which had imperiled the Safawid state fifty years previously. But the new crisis was, in fact, of a very different nature. The question from 982 / 1574

onwards was not which of the kizilbash tribes should achieve a dominant position over its rivals, but rather, whether the kizilbash as a whole could maintain their privileged position over its rivals, but rather, whether the kizilbash as a whole could maintain their privileged position as the military aristocracy in the Safawid state, in the face of the challenge from new ethnic elements in Safawid society, namely, the Georgians and Circassians. The majority of these people were the offspring of prisoners taken during the course of four campaigns waged in the Caucasus by Tahmasp between 947/1540-I and 961/1553-4. In addition, a certain number of Georgian noblemen voluntarily entered Safawid service during Tahmasp in 984/1576, the power of the Georgian and Circassian women in the royal *haram* was such that they intervened in political affairs and engaged in active intrigue with a view to securing the throne for their own sons. In this way, they introduced into the Safawid state dynastic rivalries of a new kind.

The struggle for power between the kizilbash and the Georgians and Circassians, continued during the reigns of Ismail II (985/1578-996/1588), and was finally settled in favour of the latter by the measures taken by Shah Abbas I [q.v.] (996/1588-1038/1629) measures which radically altered the social basis of the Safawid state.

The situation which 'Abbas faced at his accession was critical in the extreme. The Ottomans had resumed operation in Adharbaydjan, and the citadel at Tabriz had been in their hands since 993/1585.

In the east, the Uzbeks stormed Harat in 997/1589, and swept on across Khurasan as far as Mashhad. To free his hands to deal with the Uzbeks, 'Abbas was forced to negotiate a humiliating peace with the Ottomans which left more Persian territory in Ottoman hands than ever before (998/1589-90).

The events of his youth had led him to place no faith in the loyalty of the kizilbash and he set about creating a standing army which would be paid direct from the Royal Treasury and would be loyal only to himself. From the ranks of the Georgians and Circassians (thereafter termed Ghulaman-i Rhassa-Yi Sharifa) he formed a cavalry regiment of some 10,000 men, and a personal bodyguard of 3,000 men. A regiment of musketeers, 12,000 strong, recruited from the Persian peasantry, and an artillery regiment, also of 12,000 men, completed the new standing army of 37,000 men.

Under Shah Sulayman (1077/1666-1105/1694), who was an alcoholic, and under the pious but uxorious Shah Sultan Husayn (1105/1694-1135/1722), neither of whom took any interest in state affairs, the progressive breakdown of the central administration was marked by increasing inefficiency and corruption at all levels of government. The military machine had been allowed to run down to such an extent that the Shah had to turn to the Georgians for help in dealing with a band of Baluchi marauders in 1110/1698-99.

About the same time the Afshar chief Nadir Khan emerged as the most powerful of the tribal chiefs lending their support to the Safawid house, and in 1142/1729 he drove the Afghans from Isfahan and re-established the Safawid monarchy in the person of Tahmasp II. It soon became clear, however, that Nadir Khan's support of the Safawids was only a device to enable him to use pro-Safawid sentiment for his own ends. In 1145/1732 he deposed Tahmasp II in favour of the infant Abbas III, for whom he acted as regent. Four years later, he abandoned this fiction, and had himself crowned as Nadir Shah. This marked the extinction of the Safawid dynasty, which had existed only in name since 1134/1722.

Nadir Shah (1148/1736-1160/1747) consciously modeled himself on Timur, and there are some points of similarity between his career and that of his exemplar. Like Timur, Nadir was primarily, indeed solely, a soldier, and, like Timur, he was totally unable to administer the territories overrun by his armies. As a result, just as the campaigns of Timur had left a vacuum in south-west Asia, so those of Nadir disrupted the administrative system inherited from the Safawids, impoverished the state, and led to a general breakdown of law and order. The result was half a century of civil war as the Zands and the Kadiars fought for supremacy in the vacuum created by Nadir. Nadir restored national dignity and prestige after the humiliation of the Afghan episode, and recovered Iranian territory which had been usurped by the Ottomans, the Russians, and the

Afghans. After an ineffectual siege of Baghdad in 1145/1733 (the Iranian army still had no proper siege artillery). And an initial defeat at the hands of the Ottoman relief army, Nadir turned the tables on the Ottomans on 11 Dimada II 1146/9 November 1733, and the Ottoman commander, Topal Osman Pasha, was killed. A provisional treaty between Nadir Shah and Ahmad Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, provided for the return to Iran of all territory seized by the Ottomans in the previous ten years, but the treaty was never ratified by the Porte. In 1147/1735 Russia surrendered Baku and Darband, and Nadir struck further blows against the Ottomans. Abd Allah Pasha Koprulu-zade, governor of Kars, was killed at the battle of Ak Tepe: Ali Pasha surrendered at Gandia, and Ishak Pasha at Tiflis; Erivan fell soon afterwards.

In 1153/1741 Nadir Shah was at the height of his power, but signs of approaching insanity were already visible. His madness was characterized by an overweening lust for power and the most extreme avarice. He became subject to ever more violent fits of rage, associated with the inflicting of ever more terrible punishments. Instead of using his Indian treasure to replenish the exchequer, which he had exhausted by his endless campaigns, he hoarded it in a special treasure-house at Kalat-I Nadiri [q.v.] in Khurasan, and imposed further crippling taxburdens on the people to finance expeditions which had no strategic justification, such as his disastrous campaign in Daghestan in 1154-55/1741-2. Revolts broke out in various parts of this empire, and his attempt to effect a reconciliation with the Sunni *ulama* did not add to his popularity. On 11 Diumada II 1160/20 June 1747 he was assassinated by a group of his own officers. His death was followed by a period of anarchy and civil war. In the south, the Zand dynasty gave that part of the country at least a brief respite in the form of orderly, and on the whole good, government. After the death (1193/I 779) of Karim Khan Zand, however, the Zands were weakened by dynastic feuds, and this gave the Kadiars, who from their base at Astarabad had gradually brought most of northern Persia under their control, their chance. Aka Muhammad Khan Kajar escaped from Zand captivity at Shiraz and embarked on a sixteen-year struggle to assert his authority over that of rival Kadiar chiefs, and to overthrow the Zands. By 1209/1795 he had achieved both objectives.

The new rulers of Iran, the Kadiars, were of Turkoman stock. Like the Afshars, they had formed part of the group of Turkoman tribes which had brought the Safawids to power, and which had constituted the military aristocracy of the Safawid state. The Kadiars, however, like two other Trans-Caucasian Turkoman tribes, the Afshars and the Bayats, did not come into prominence until the middle of the 10th/16th century. The first ruler of the new dynasty, Aka Muhammad Shah, possessed undoubted administrative ability. Making Tehran his capital, he restored security and public order, and reunited Iran under a strong and efficient central administration for the first time for more than half a century. But he maintained his position by the fear which he inspired in all. The castration which he had suffered as a boy at the hands of Nadir's nephew, Adil Shah, had rendered him vicious and cruel. In an age when the qualities of mercy and compassion were rare, he became a byword for bloodthirstiness. His ruthless elimination of all possible rivals caused rifts within the Kadiar ranks, and militated against the stability of the dynasty. The succession was disputed both in 1250/1834, and again in 1264/I 848. Outwardly pious, he cared nothing for an oath, and did not hesitate to obtain his ends by treachery. On 21 Dhu'l-Hidida 1211/I7 June 1797, two years after his coronation, he was assassinated by two of his soldiers. He was succeeded by his nephew, Fath Ali Shah.

Fath Ali Shah [q.v.] had scarcely ascended the throne when he was forced to recognize that a major change had occurred in the relations between Iran and her neighbours in general, and between Iran and the Great Powers in particular. The advent of the 19th century saw the beginnings of Great Power rivalry in Persia which directly or indirectly affected the political, social and economic life of the country.

Nasir al-Din Shah, who came to the throne in 1848, and whose long reign was ended only by his assassination in 1896, was a more able man than either of his two immediate predecessors. He appreciated the need for change, if Iran was to retain her independence and to break the political stranglehold which was being exerted by Britain and Russia. During his reign, however, the other half of the Russian pincer gripping Iran lengthened inexorably. In 1865 the Russians captured

Tashkent, and extinguished the khanate of Khokand. In 1865 they took Bukhara and, from their new base at Krasnovodsk on the eastern shore of the Caspian, pushed steadily forward into Central Asia. They put an end to the Khanate of Khiva in 1873, crushed for ever the Turkoman tribes of the steppe at the battle of Gok Tepe [q.v.] (1881), and completed the conquest of Trans-Caspia by occupying Marw in 1884. The Atrek river was established as the new Russo-Iranian frontier in the east.

Nasir al-Din Shah instituted a policy of granting concessions to European powers, in the hope that this would improve the economic prosperity of the country. The net result, however, was that by the end of the 19th century, most of Iran's economic resources were exploited or directed by foreign concessionaires, who obtained sweeping concessions in return for paltry sums of money which satisfied the Shah's immediate needs. In 1872, for example, a Baron Jules de Reuter, obtained the exclusive right to exploit all minerals in Iran (except gold and precious stones), to build factories, to construct railways, canals and irrigation works, to exploit the forests, to create a national bank and public utilities (such as a telegraph system), and to control the customs. Strong Russian pressure led the Shah to rescind the concession, and, as compensation, the British received a concession to establish.

Growing discontent with the incompetence and corruption of the government, and resentment at foreign political pressure and economic control, found expression during the last quarter of the 19th century in the form of a challenge to the traditional pattern of society. Secret societies (*andiumans*) were formed whose members discussed the ideas of western liberalism and problems of social reform [see DJAMIYYA]. Out of this social ferment grew the Constitutional or Nationalist movement, which began by demanding a measure of social and judicial reform, the dismissal of certain tyrannical officials, and the expulsion of certain foreign concessionaires, notably the much disliked Belgian director of Customs, and ended by demanding the promulgation of a Constitution and the establishment of a National Consultative Assembly [see DUSTUR: iv. – Iran]. Although the Fundamental Law was not signed by Muzaffar al-Din Shah until 30 December 1906, the first National Assembly (Madilis) was convened on 7th October 1906.

The victory over despotism, far from being won, had in fact barely begun, and the Nationalists, absorbed in their struggle with the Shah, were unable to prevent Iran falling even further under foreign domination. Muhammad Ali Shah, who came to the throne in 1907, tried by every means to subvert the Constitution and to prevent the implementation of bills passed by the Madilis. The religious classes, who up to this point had supported the Constitutionalists, mainly from patriotic motives, began to be alarmed by the views of some of the more radical deputies, and this portended a fatal split in the ranks of the Nationalists. On 31 August 1907 the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention, a treaty inspired by the fear of resurgent German militarism, were made public. Iran was to be divided into a Russian and a British sphere of influence, separated by a neutral zone. In June 1908 the Shah declared martial law in Tehran and closed the Madilis. Despite strong pressure from the Russians, whose troops occupied Tabriz, the Nationalists mounted in the provinces a counter-offensive which resulted in the deposition of the Shah in July 1909. His eleven-year-old son Ahmad was proclaimed Shah. In July 1911 an abortive attempt by the exiled Muhammad Ali to reinstate himself in Iran led to further direct Russian intervention, and on 3 Muharram 1330/24 December 1911 the Madilis was again forcibly closed. During World War I, although Iran was a neutral, her territory became a battlefield for Turkish, Russian and British forces, and Iran emerged from the war in a state of administrative and financial chaos. Lord Curzon's solution was an independent Iran firmly under British tutelage, and the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 provided for the appointment of British advisers to the Iranian Government. The treaty was never ratified by Iran. The Bolsheviks, after the collapse of the short-lived Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan [see DJANGALI], concluded the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26 February 1921, by the terms of which they renounced their imperialist policies of the former Tsarist regime. Five days before the signature of this treaty, Reza Khan seized power by *coup d'eta*. Reza Khan was the commander of the Cossack brigade, created in 1879 by Nasir al-Din Shah as a royal bodyguard and used by Muhammad Ali Shah to suppress the Nationalists in the period 1907-9. The

atmosphere of the post-war period was favourable to Reza Khan's attempt to re-establish national integrity and independence; the Constitution had been suspended; there had been a complete breakdown of government authority; the treasury was empty and famine conditions prevailed. Rida Khan first thought of abolishing the monarchy and establishing a republic, but, faced with strong opposition from the *ulama* and other traditional elements, he abandoned the idea. Ahmad Shah was deposed in 1923, and Reza Khan was proclaimed shah in December 1925 and crowned on 25 April 1926 as the first ruler of the new Pahlavi dynasty.

Different though their roots were, what these dictators had in common was the rejection of ethics, a contempt for the sanctity of human life, for justice and for equality before the law. They accepted the destruction of millions of people in the belief that it served desirable ends. They were responsible for a revolution in thought and action that undid centuries of progress.

Stalin and Hitler were not the first leaders to be responsible for mass killings. During the First World War, the Turks had massacred Armenians, ethnic hatred inflamed by fears that in war the Armenians would betray them. Stalin's calculated Killing of 'class enemies' and his murderous purges of those from whom he suspected opposition were the actions of a bloody tyrant, by no means the first in history. The ruthless exploitation of slave labour, the murder of the Polish officers during the Second World War and the expulsion of whole peoples from their homes, revealed the depths to which an organised modern state was capable of sinking. But nothing in the history of a Western nation equals the Nazi state's application of its theories of 'good' which ended with the factory murder of millions of men, women and children, mostly Jews and Gypsies. There were mass killings of 'inferior Slavs'. Russians and Poles, and those who were left were regarded as fit only to serve as labour for the German masters.

Unit Four

The world from the 20th to the 21st Century (Part I)

Historical epochs do not coincide strictly with centuries. The French Revolution in 1789, not the year 1800, marked the beginning of a new historical era. The beginning of the twentieth century, too, is better dated to 1871, when international instability became manifest in Europe and Asia and a new era of imperial rivalry, which the Germans called *Weltpolitik*, began. On the European continent Germany had become by far the most powerful military nation and was rapidly advancing industrially. In eastern Asia during the 1890s a modernized Japan waged its first successful war of aggression against China. In the Americas the foundations were laid for the emergence of the US as a superpower later in the century. The US no longer felt secure in isolation. Africa was finally partitioned between the European powers. These were some of the portents indicating the great changes to come. There were many more.

Modernisation was creating new industrial and political conflict and dividing society. The state was becoming more centralized, its bureaucracy grew and achieved control to an increasing degree over the lives of the individual. Social tensions were weakening the tsarist Russian Empire and during the first decade of the twentieth century Russia was defeated by Japan. The British Empire was at bay and Britain was seeking support, not certain which way to turn. Fierce nationalism, the build-up of vast armies and navies, and unquestioned patriotism that regarded war as an opportunity to prove manhood rather than as a catastrophe, characterized the mood as the new century began. Boys played with their tin soldiers and adults dressed up in the finery of uniforms. The rat-infested mud of the trenches and machine guns moving down tens of thousands of young men as yet lay beyond the imagination. Soldiering was still glorious, chivalrous and glamorous. But the early twentieth century also held the promise of a better and more civilized life in the future. Democracy was gaining ground in the new century. The majority of men were enfranchised in Western Europe and the US. The more enlightened nations understood that good government required a relationship of consent between those who made the laws and the mass of the people who had to obey them. The best way to secure cooperation was through the process of popularly elected parliamentary assemblies that allowed the people some influence-government by the will of the majority, at least in appearance. The Reichstag, the French Chambers, the Palace of Westminster, the two houses of congress the Russian Duma, all met in splendid edifices intended to reflect their importance. In the West the trend was thus clearly established early in the twentieth century against arbitrary rule. However much national constitutions differed, another accepted feature of the civilized polity was the rule of law, the provision of an independent judiciary meting out equal justice to rich and poor, the powerful and the weak. Practice might differ from theory, but justice was presented as blindfolded: justice to all, without favours to any.

All over the world there was discrimination against a group that accounted for half the earth's population-women. It took the American movement half a century to win, in 1920, the right to vote. In Britain the agitation for women's rights took the drastic form of public demonstrations after 1906, but not until 1918 did women over thirty years of age gain the vote, and those aged between twenty-one and thirty had to wait even longer. But the acceptance of votes for women in the West had already been signposted before the First World War. New Zealand in 1893 was the first country to grant women the right to vote in national elections; Australia followed in 1908. But even as the twenty-first century begins there are countries in the Middle East where women are denied this basic right. Moreover, this struggle represents only the tip of the iceberg of discrimination against women on issues such as education, entry into the professions, property rights and equal pay for equal work. Incomplete as emancipation remains in Western societies, there are many countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa where women are still treated as inferior, there chattels of their fathers or husbands. In India, for example, orthodox Hindu marriage customs were not changed by law until 1955. As

For birth-control education, which began in the West in the nineteenth century, freeing women from the burden of repeated pregnancies, it did not reach the women of the third World until late in the twentieth century-though it is there that the need is greatest.

In 1900 Europeans and their descendants who had settled in the Americas, Australasian and southern Africa looked likely to dominate the globe. They achieved this tremendous extension of power in the world because of the great size of their combined populations and because of the technological changes which, Collectively, are known as the industrial revolution. One in every four human beings lived in Europe, some 400 million out of a total world population of 1,600 million in 1900. If we add the millions who had left Europe and multiplied in the Americas and elsewhere, more than one in every three human beings was European or of European descent. A century later, it was less than one in six; 61 percent of world's population lives in Asia; there are more Africans than Europeans. In 1900 the Europeans ruled a great world empire with a population in Africa, Asia, the Americas and the Pacific of nearly 500 million by 1914. To put it another way, before 1914 only about one in three people had actually avoided being ruled by Europeans and their descendants, most of whom were unshaken in their conviction that their domination was natural and beneficial and that the only problem it raised was to arrange it peacefully between them. By the end of the twentieth century direct imperial rule had all but disappeared.

In 1900 there were some obviously dying empires, and the 'stronger nations' competing for their territories were the European great powers and Japan. But during the years immediately preceding the Great War the issue had changed. Now the great powers turned on each other in the belief that some must die if the others were to live in safety. Even Germany, the strongest of them, would not be safe, so the Kaiser's generals believed, against the menace of a combination of countries opposing it. That was the fatal assumption which, more than anything, led to the 1914-18 war. It was reducing the complexity of international relations to a perverse application of Darwinian theory.

The First World War destroyed the social cohesion of pre-war continental Europe. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires broke up; Germany, before 1914 first among the continental European countries, was defeated and humiliated; Italy gained little from its enormous sacrifices; the tsarist Russian Empire disintegrated, and descended into civil war and chaos. In their despair people sought new answers to the problems that threatened to overwhelm them, new ideals to replace respect for kings and princes and the established social order. In chaos a few ruthless men were able to determine the fate of nations, ushering in a European dark age in mid-century. Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin were able to create a more efficient and crueler autocracy than that of the Romanovs. The new truths were held to be found in the works of Karl Marx as interpreted by the Russian dictators, who imposed their ideas of communism on the people. In Italy disillusionment with parliamentary government led to fascism. In Germany, democracy survived by a narrow margin but was demolished when its people despaired once more in the depression of the early 1930s. Hitler's doctrine of race then found a ready response, and his successes at home and abroad confirmed him in power.

The Nazi evil was ended in 1945. But it had been overcome only with the help of the communist power of the Soviet Union. As long as Stalin lived, in the Soviet Union and its satellite states the rights of individuals counted for little. In Asia China and its neighbours had suffered war and destruction when the Japanese, who adopted from the West doctrines of racial superiority, forced them into their cynically named 'co-prosperity sphere'. The ordeal was not over for China when the Second World War ended. Civil war followed until the victory of the communists. Mao Zedong imposed his brand of communist theory on a largely peasant society for three decades. Many millions perished in the terror he unleashed, the class war and as a result of experiments designed to create an abundant communist society. In Asia, too, the regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia provided a more recent example of inhumanity in the pursuit of ideological theories amounting to genocide.

By the close of the century the tide finally turned against communist autocracy and dictatorship. The suffering and oppression all over the world in the twentieth century was much greater than it had been in the nineteenth. Only the minority whose standards of living improved, who lived in freedom in countries where representative government remained an unbroken tradition, had the promise of progress fulfilled through greater abundance of wealth. But even in these fortunate societies few families were untouched by the casualties of the wars of the twentieth century. Western societies were spared the nightmare after 1945 of a third world war, which more than once seemed possible, though they were not spared war itself. These wars, however, involved far greater suffering to the peoples living in Asia, Africa and the Middle East than to the West.

The Cold War had divided the most powerful nations in the world into opposing camps. The West saw itself as the 'free world' and the East as the society of the future, the people's alliance of the communist world. They were competing for dominance in the rest of the world, in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, where the west's overwhelming influence was challenged by the East. That struggle dominated the second half of the twentieth century. Regional conflicts in the world came to be seen through the prism of the Cold War. Within the two blocs differences also arose, of which the most serious was the quarrel between the Soviet Union and China, which further complicated developments in Asia. That the Cold War never turned to a real war between its protagonists was largely due to MAD, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. Both sides had piled up nuclear arsenals capable of destroying each other and much of the world, and there was no sure defence against all the incoming missiles. Mutual assured destruction kept the dangerous peace between them. The battle for supremacy was fought by other means, including proxy wars between nations not possessing the 'bomb' but armed and supported by the nuclear powers.

No year goes by without one or more wars occurring somewhere in the world, many of them savage civil wars. What is new in the 1990s is that these wars no longer bring the most powerful nations of the world into indirect conflict with each other. The decision of Russia and the US to cease arming and supplying opposing contestants in the Afghan civil wars marked the end of an indirect conflict that had been waged between the Soviet Union and the US since the Second World War in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. But this understanding will not banish wars. Intervention, whether by a group of nations acting under UN sponsorship or by a major country acting as policeman, is costly. UN resources are stretched to the limits by peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus, Cambodia, and former Yugoslavia and other trouble spots. No universal peacekeeping force exists. Intervention would therefore be likely only when the national interests of powerful countries became involved. It would be less likely, where the need was purely humanitarian. Farther to the east lay China, the largest nation in the world with a population in 1900 of about 420 million.

When Western influence in China was threatened by the so-called Boxer rising in 1900, the West acted with a show of solidarity. An international army was landed in China and 'rescued' the Europeans. Europeans were not to be forced out by 'native' violence, The Western powers' financial and territorial hold over China tightened, though they shrank from the responsibility of directly ruling the whole of China and the hundreds of millions of Chinese living there. Instead, European influence was exerted indirectly through Chinese officials who were ostensibly responsible to a central Chinese government in Peking. The Western Europeans detached a number of trading posts from China proper, or acquired strategic bases along the coast and inland and forced the Chinese to permit the establishment of semi-colonial international settlements. The most important, in Shanghai, served the Europeans as a commercial trading center. Britain enlarged its colony of Hong Kong by forcing China to grant it a lease of the adjacent New Territories in 1898. Russia sought to annex extensive Chinese territory in the north.

With hindsight it can be seen that by the turn of the century the European world empires had reached their zenith. Just at this point, though, a non-European Western power, the US, had staked its first claim to power and influence in the Pacific. But Europe could not yet, in 1900, call in the US to redress the balance which Russia threatened to upset in eastern Asia. That task was

undertaken by an eastern Asian nation-Japan. Like China, Japan was never conquered by Europeans. Forced to accept Western influence by the Americans in the mid-nineteenth century, the Japanese were too formidable to be thought of as 'natives' to be subdued. Instead, the largest European empire, the British, sought and won the alliance of Japan in 1902 on terms laid down by the Japanese leaders.

Europe's interests were global, and possible future conflicts over respective imperial spheres preoccupied its leaders and those sections of society with a stake in empire. United, their power in the world was overwhelming. But the states of Europe were not united. Despite their sense of common purpose in the world, European leaders saw themselves simultaneously ensnared in a struggle within their own continent, a struggle which each nation believed, would decide whether it would continue as a world power.

The armaments race and competition of empire, with vast standing armies facing each other and the new battleship fleets of dreadnoughts, were symptoms of increasing tension rather than the cause of the Great War to come. Historians have debated why the West plunged into such a cataclysmic conflict. Social tensions within each country and the fears of the ruling classes, especially in the Kaiser's Germany, indirectly contributed to a political malaise during a period of great change. But as an explanation why war broke out in 1914 the theory that a patriotic war was 'an escape forward' to evade conflict at home fails to carry conviction, even in the case of Germany. It seems almost a truism to assert that wars have come about because nations simply do not believe they can go on coexisting. It is, nevertheless, a better explanation than the simple one that the *prime* purpose of nations at war is necessarily the conquest of more territory. Of Russia and Japan that may have been true in the period 1900-5. But another assumption, at least as important, was responsible for the Great War. Among the then 'great powers', as they were called in the early twentieth century, there existed a certain fatalism that the growth and decline of nations must inevitably entail war between them. The stronger would fall on the weaker and divide the booty between them. To quote the wise and experienced British prime minister, the third Marquess of Salisbury, at the turn of the century:

Your may roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and the dying... the weak states are becoming weaker and the strong states are becoming weaker and the strong states are becoming stronger... the living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying and the seeds and causes of conflict among civilized nations will speedily appear. Of course, it is not to be supposed that clearly, then, there was already opposition to imperialism on moral grounds by the beginning of the twentieth century. The opponents' arguments would come to carry more weight later in the century. Morality has more appeal when it is also believed to be of practical benefit. As the nineteenth century came to an end competition for empire drove each nation on, fearful that to lose out would inevitably lead to national decline. In mutual suspicion the Western countries were determined to carve up into colonies and spheres of influence any remaining weaker regions.

The expansion of Western power in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries carried with it the seeds of its own destruction. It was not any 'racial superiority' that had endowed Western man with a unique gift for organizing society, for government or for increasing the productivity of man in the factory and on the land. The West took its knowledge to other parts of the world, and European descendants had increased productivity in manufacturing industries in the US beyond that of their homelands. But high productivity was not a Western rate.

The Wars of American Independence demonstrated that peoples in one region of the world will not for ever consent to be ruled by peoples far distant. By 1900 self-government and separate nationhood had been won, through war or through consent, by other descendants of Europeans who had become Australians, Brazilians, Argentinians, Canadians and, soon, South Africans. These national rebellions were led by white Europeans. It remained a widespread European illusion that such a sense of independence and nationhood could not develop among the black peoples of Africa in the foreseeable future. A people's capacity for self-rule was crudely related to 'race' and 'colour', with the white race on top of the pyramid, followed by the 'brown' Indians, who, it was conceded, would one distant day be capable of self-government. At the bottom of the

pile was the 'black' race. The 'yellow' Chinese and Japanese peoples did not fit easily into the colour scheme, not least because the Japanese had already shown an amazing capacity to Westernise. Fearful of the hundreds of millions of people in China and Japan, the West thus conceived a dread of the yellow race striking back-the 'yellow peril'.

The spread of European knowledge undermined the basis of imperialist dominance. The Chinese, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians and the Africans would all apply this knowledge, and goods would be manufactured in Tokyo and Hong Kong as sophisticated as those produced anywhere else in the world. A new sense of nationalism would be born, resistant to Western dominance and fighting it with Western scientific knowledge and weapons. When independence came, older traditions would reassert themselves and synthesis with the new knowledge to form a unique amalgam in each region. The world remains divided and still too large and diverse for any one group of nations, or for anyone people or culture, to dominate.

All this lay in the future, the near future. Western control of most of the world appeared in 1900 to be unshakeable fact. Africa was partitioned. All that was left to be shared out were two nominally independent states, Morocco and Egypt, but this involved little more than tidying up European spheres of influence. Abyssinia, alone, had survived the European attack.

The Ottoman Empire, stretching from Balkan Europe through Asia Minor and the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, was still an area of intense rivalry among the European powers. The independent states in this part of the world could not resist European encroachment, both economic and political, but the rulers did succeed in retaining some independence by maneuvering between competing European powers. The partition of the Middle East had been put off time and time again because in so sensitive a strategic area, on the route to India, Britain and Russia never trusted each other sufficiently to strike any lasting bargain, preferring to maintain the Ottoman Empire and Persia as impotent buffer states between their respective spheres of interest. Much copper, As its people turned it into the workshop of the world in copper. As its people turned it into the workshop of the world in the nineteenth century, so it relied on food from overseas, including grain, meat sugar and tea, to feed the growing population. Some of these imports came from the continent of Europe close by, the rest from far afield- the Americas, Australasia and India. As the twentieth century progressed, oil imports assumed and increasing importance. The British mercantile marine, the world's largest, carried all these goods across the oceans. Colonies were regarded by Europeans as essential to provide secure sources of raw materials; just as important, they provide markets for industrialized Europe's output.

Outside Europe only the US matched and, indeed, exceeded the growth of European industry in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Europe and the US accounted for virtually all the world trade in manufactured goods, Which doubled between 1900 and 1913. There was a corresponding increase in demand for raw materials and food supplied by the Americas, Asia and the less industrialized countries of Europe. Part of Europe's wealth was used to develop resources in other areas of the world; railways everywhere, manufacture and mining in Asia, Africa and North and South America; but Europe and the US continued to dominate I actual production.

Global competition for trade increased colonial rivalry for raw materials and markets, and the US was not immune to the fever. The division of Asia and Africa into outright European colonies entailed also their subservience to the national economic policies of the imperial power. Among these were privileged access to colonial sources of wealth, cheap labour and raw materials, domination of the colonial market and, where possible, shutting out national rivals from these benefits. Thus, the US was worried at the turn of the twentieth century about exclusion from what was believed to be the last great undeveloped market in the world-China. In an imperialist movement of great importance, Americans advanced across the Pacific, annexing Hawaii and occupying the Philippines in 1898. The US also served notice of its opposition to the division of China into exclusive economic regions. Over the century a special relationship developed between America and China that was to contribute to the outbreak of war between the US and Japan in 1941, with all its consequences for world history.

By 1900 most of Africa and Asia was already partitioned between the European nations. With the exception of China, what was left- the Samoan islands, Morocco and the frontiers of Togo-caused more diplomatic crises than was warranted by the importance of such territories.

Pride in an expanding empire, however, was not an attitude shared by everyone. There was also an undercurrent of dissent. Britain's Gladstonian Liberals in the 1880s had not been carried away by imperialist fever. An article in the *pall Mall Gazette* in 1884 took up the case for indigenous peoples. 'All coloured men'. It declared, 'seem to be regarded as fair game', on the assumption that 'no one has a right to any rule or sovereignty in either hemisphere but men of European birth or origin'. During the Bore War(1899-1902) a courageous group of Liberals challenged the prevailing British jingoism. Lloyd George, a future prime minister, had to escape the fury of a Birmingham crowd by leaving the town hall disguised as a policeman. Birmingham was the political base of Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary who did most to propagate the 'new imperialism' and to echo Cecil Rhodes's call for the brotherhood of the 'Anglo-Saxon races', supposedly the British, the Germans and white Americans of British or German descent. Americans, however, were not keen to respond to the embrace.

After the Spanish-American War of 1898 the colonization of the Philippines by the US led to a fierce national debate. One of the most distinguished and eloquent leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League formed after that war denounced US policies in the Philippines and Cuba in a stirring passage:

This nation cannot endure half republic and half colony-half vassal. Our form of government, our traditions, our present interests and our future welfare, all forbid our entering upon a career of conquest.

To the Asians and Africans, the European presented a common front with only local variations: some spoke German, others French or English. There are several features of this common outlook. First, there was the Westerners' feeling of superiority, crudely proven by their capacity to conquer other peoples more numerous than the invading European armies. Vast tracts of land were seized by the European, at very small human cost to themselves, from the ill-equipped indigenous peoples of Asia and Africa. That was one of the main reasons for the extension of European power over other regions of the world. Since the mid-nineteenth century the Europeans had avoided fighting each other for empire, since the cost of war between them would have been of quite a different order.

Superiority, ultimately proven on the battlefield, was, the Europeans in 1900 felt, but one aspect of their civilization. All other peoples they thought of as uncivilized, though they recognized that in past ages these peoples had enjoyed a kind of civilization of their own, and their artistic manifestations were prized. China, India, Egypt and, later, Africa were looted of great works of art. Most remain to the present day in the museums of the west.

A humanitarian European impulse sought to impose on the conquered peoples the Christian religion, including Judaeo-Christian ethics, and Western concepts of family relationships and conduct. At their best the Western colonizers were genuinely paternalistic. Happiness, they believed, would follow on the adoption of Western ways, and the advance of mankind materially and spiritually would be accomplished only by overcoming the prejudice against Western thought.

From its very beginning, profit and gain were also powerful spurs to empire. In the twentieth century industrialized Europe came to depend on

The import of raw materials for its factories; Britain need vast quantities; Britain needed vast quantities of raw cotton to turn into cloth, as well as nickel, rubber and

There was a sense of cultural affinity among the aristocracy and bourgeoisie of Europe. Governed by monarchs who were related to each other and who tended to reign for long periods or, in France, by presidents who changed too frequently to be remembered for long, the well-to-do felt at home anywhere in Europe. The upper reaches of society were cosmopolitan, disporting themselves on the Riviera, in Paris and in Dresden; they felt that they had much in common and that they belonged to a superior civilization. Some progress was real. Increasingly, provision was made to help the majority of the people who were poor, no doubt in part to cut the ground from

under socialist agitators and in part in response to trade union and political pressures brought about by the widening franchise in the West. Pensions and insurance for workers were first instituted in Germany under Bismarck and spread to most of the rest of Western Europe. Medical care, too, improved in the expanding cities. Limits were set on the hours and kind of work children were allowed to perform. Universal education became the norm. The advances made in the later nineteenth century were in many ways extended after 1900.

Equal rights were not universal in the West. Working people were struggling to form effective unions so that, through concerted strike action, they could overcome their individual weakness when bargaining for decent wages and conditions. Only a minority, though, were members of a union. In the US in 1900, only about 1 million out of more than 27 million workers belonged to a labour union. Unions in America were male dominated and, just as in Britain, women had to form their own unions. American unions also excluded most immigrants and black workers.

Ethnic minorities were discriminated against even in a political system such as that of the US, which prided itself as the most advanced democracy in the world. Reconstruction after the Civil War had bitterly disappointed the African Americans in their hopes of gaining equal rights. Their claims to justice remained a national issue for much of the twentieth century.

Unit Five

The World from the 20th to the 21st Century (Part II)

The World's history is interwoven with migrations. The poor and the persecuted have left their homeland for other countries. The great movement of peoples from Eastern to Western Europe and further west across the Argentine, Australasian and South Africa continued throughout the nineteenth century, most of the emigrants being unskilled workers from rural areas. But this free movement of peoples, interrupted by the First World War, was halted soon after its close. In countries controlled by Europeans and their descendants quotas were imposed, for example by the US Immigration Act of 1924, denying free access to further immigrants from Europe. These countries so arranged their immigration policies that they slowed down to a trickle or excluded altogether the entry of Asians and Africans. In the US the exclusion of Asians from China and Japan had begun well before 1914. They had been welcome only when their labor was needed. The same attitude became clear in Britain where immigration of West Indians was at first encouraged after 1945, only to be restricted in 1962. The demand for labor, fluctuating according to the needs of a country's economy, and the strength of racial prejudice have been the main underlying reasons for immigration policies. While the West restricted intercontinental migrations after the First World War within Asia the movement continued, with large population transfers from India, Japan and Korea to Burma, Malaya, Ceylon, Borneo and Manchuria. Overseas Chinese in Asia play a crucial role, as do Indian traders in sub-Saharan Africa.

After the Second World War there were huge migrations once more in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Millions of Japanese returned to their homeland. The partition of the Indian subcontinent led to the largest sudden and forced migration in history of some 25 million from east to west and west to east. At the close of the war in Europe, West Germany absorbed 20 Million from Europe migrated to Canada and to Australia; 3 million North Koreans fled to the South.

The US experienced a changing pattern of immigration after the Second World War. More than 11 million people were registered as entering the country between 1941 and 1980. The great majority of immigrants had once been of European origin. After 1945 increasing numbers of Puerto Ricans and Filipinos took advantage of their rights of entry. There was a large influx of Hispanics from the Caribbean: in addition probably as many as 5 million illegal immigrants crossed the Mexican border to find low-paid work in burgeoning California. The proportion of Europeans fell to less than one-fifth of the total number of immigrants. The second-largest ethnic influx came from Asia- Taiwan, Korea and, after the Vietnam War, Vietnam. The US has become more of multicultural society than ever before. But, unlike most black people and Hispanics, many Asians have succeeded in working their way out of the lower strata of American society.

Although the migration of Europeans of Africa south of the Sahara after 1945 was less spectacular in terms of numbers-probably less than a million in all- their impact as settlers and administrators on the history of African countries was crucial for the history of the continent.

There are no accurate statistics relating to the peoples of the world who, since 1945, have been driven by fear, hunger or the hope of better opportunities to migrate. They probably exceed 80 million. More than 10 million are still refugees without a country of their own; political upheavals and famines create more refugees every year. The more prosperous countries of the world continue to erect barriers against entry from the poor countries ;and stringently examine all those who seek asylum. In Europe, the Iron Curtain has gone but an invisible curtain has replaced it to stop the flow of migration from the East to the West, from Africa across the Mediterranean, from the poor south of the world to the north.

The only solution is to assist the poor countries to develop so that their populations have a hope of rising standards of living. The aid given by the wealthy has proved totally inadequate to meet these needs, and loans have led to soaring debt repayments. The commodities the Third World has to sell have generally risen in price less than the manufacturing imports it buys. The natural disadvantage is compounded by corruption, economic mismanagement, the waste of

natural disadvantage is compounded by corruption, economic mismanagement, the waster of resources on the purchase of weapons, wars and the gross inequalities of wealth. But underlying all these is the remorseless growth of population, which vitiates the advances that are achieved.

There has been a population explosion in the course of the twentieth century. It is estimated that 1,600 million people inhabited planet earth in 1900. By 1930 the figure reached 2,000 million, in 1970 it was 3,600 million and by the end of the century the world's population exceeded 6,000 million. Most of that increase, has taken place in the Third World, swelling the size of cities like Calcutta, Jakarta and Cairo to many millions. The inexorable pressure of population on resources has bedeviled efforts to improve standards of living in the poorest regions of the world, such as Bangladesh. The gap between the poor parts of the world and the rich widened rather than narrowed. Birth- control education is now backed by Third World governments, but, apart from China's draconian application, is making a slow impact on reducing the acceleration of population growth. Despite the suffering caused, wars and famines inflict no more than temporary dents on the upward curve. Only the experience with AIDS may prove different, if no cure is found: in sub-Saharan Africa the disease is endemic, and in Uganda it has infected one person in every six. The one positive measure of population control is to achieve economic and social progress in the poorest countries of the world. With more than 800 million people living in destitution the world is far from being in sight of this goal.

At the end of the twentieth century many of the problems that afflicted the world at its beginning remain unresolved. The prediction of Thomas Robert Malthus in his *Essay on the principle of populations* published in 1798 that, unless checked, the growth of population would outrun the growth of production, still blights human hopes for progress and happiness in the Third World. According to one estimate, a third of all children under five, some 150 million, in the Third World are undernourished and prey to disease. Of the 122 million children born in 1979, one in ten were dead by the beginning of 1981. In Africa there are still countries where one child in four does not survive to its first birthday. In Western society, too rich a diet has led to dramatic increases in heart disease. In the Third World, According to the UN secretary- general in 1989, 500 million go hungry and every year there are 10 million more. The Brandt report, *North-South: A Programme for survival* (1980), offered an even higher estimate, and declared that there was 'no more important task before the world community than the elimination of hunger and malnutrition in all countries'. NO one can calculate the figures with any accuracy. The world community has reacted only to dramatic televised pictures of suffering and famine, for example in the Horn of Africa, but there is no real sense of global agreement on the measures necessary to tackle the problem. Now that the Third World is politically independent, the former Western colonial powers

Are conveniently absolved from direct responsibility.

The political independence of the once Western-dominated globe represents an enormous change, one that occurred much more rapidly than was expected in the West before the Second World War. But in many countries independence did not lead to better government or the blessings of liberty. Third World societies were not adequately prepared, their wealth and education too unequally distributed to allow any sort of democracy to be established- although this was accomplished in India. But on the Indian subcontinent, as elsewhere in the former colonial states, ethnic strife and bloodshed persist. Corruption, autocracy and the abuse of human rights remain widespread.

In eastern Asia at the beginning of the century the partition of China seemed to be at hand, and Japan already claimed to be the predominant power. But China proved too large to be absorbed and partitioned. The military conflict between Japan and its Pacific neighbours ended only in 1945. By the close of the twentieth century it has emerged as an economic superpower decisively influencing world economic relations. China economically still poor but developing rapidly, remains by far the largest and most populous unified nation in the world. By the end of the century the last foreign outposts taken from it before the twentieth century, Hong Kong and Macao, have become part of its national territory again. Apart from Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea, China in the twenty-first century is the last communist state in the world.

At the beginning of the century Karl Marx had inspired socialist thinking and, indeed, much political action in the Western world. The largest socialist party in 1900 was in the kaiser's Germany. But these socialist parties believed that the road to power lay through constitutional means. Revolutionaries were on the fringe-one of them the exiled Lenin in Zurich-their prospects hopeless until the First World War transformed them and created the possibility violent revolutions in the East. By the end of the century, in an overwhelmingly peaceful revolution communism and the cult of Marxism Leninism have been discredited. Whatever takes their place will change the course of the twenty first century. The unexpected revolutions that swept through central and Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991 were , on the whole, no less peaceful. In every corner of the globe the autocratic, bureaucratic state faced a powerful challenge. The comparative economic success and social progress achieved by the West through the century proved desirable to the rest of the world, as did its institutions, especially the 'free market' and 'democracy' with a multi-party system. But how will these concepts be transferred to societies which have never practiced them?

'Freedom', 'democracy' and the 'free market' are simple concepts but their realization is beset by ambiguity, In societies lately subjected to autocratic rule, how much freedom can be allowed without risking disintegration into anarchy and disorder? Not every culture embraces Western ideals of democracy as a desirable goal. There is no Western country that permits a free market to function without restraint. Without protecting the interests of workers and consumers. These institutional restraints have taken years to develop. How large a role should the state play? Not everything can be privatized, and certainly not instantly. How large a welfare system needs to be created? Communism' too has lost precise meaning. Communism in China today is very different from the communism of thirty years ago, now that private enterprises are flourishing. Labels change their meaning. Nor do simple slogans provide the answers.

At the beginning of the twentieth century one could believe that a better world was gradually emerging. History was the story of progress. For some this meant that socialist ideals would lead to a utopia before the century had come to an end. In mid-century that faith in human progress and in the inevitable march of civilization was shattered. The power of National Socialism and its destructive master-race doctrine were broken; it was the end of an evil empire but not the end of tyranny. The horrors, corruption and inefficiency of autocracy, with its denial of humanity, lie exposed.

The world has learnt that it benefits all to conduct trade with a minimum of barriers though many removed. Standards of living have risen with technological progress beyond what generations a hundred years ago could have dreamt of. Medical progress in the developed world has increased life expectancy. But the world is one of even more extremes. The developed world is prosperous and the worst of poverty banished. But the majority of people in Africa, Latin American and eastern Asia remain sunk in poverty, only small groups enjoying a, generally corrupt high life with little social conscience for the rest. Famine remains widespread and in parts of the world such as sub-Saharan Africa AIDS is ravaging the people. The rich world's help for the poor is wholly inadequate still, but without reform, such aid as is provided frequently does not reach those most in need of it. There are huge global problems that remain to be addressed in the twenty-first century, not least among them the deterioration of the global environment. How successfully they will be addressed in the decades to come remains shrouded from contemporary view.

The abiding strength of nationalism from the nineteenth century right through the twentieth has generally been underestimated by Western historians. Hopes of peace for mankind and a lessening of national strife were aroused by the formation of the League of Nations after the Great War of 1914-18. But long before the outbreak of the Second World War the principle of 'collective security' had broken down when the undertakings to the League by its member states clashed with perceived national interests. The United Nations began with a burst of renewed hope after the Second World War but could not bridge the antagonisms of the Cold War. Both the League and the UN Performed useful international functions but their effectiveness was limited whenever powerful nations refused their cooperation.

Despite growing global interdependence on many issues, including trade, the environment and health, national interests were narrowly interpreted rather than seen as secondary to the interests of the international community. Nationalism was not diminished in the twentieth century by a shrinking world of mass travel and mass communication, by the universal possession of cheap transistor radios and the widespread availability of television, nor by any ideology claiming to embrace mankind. To cite one obvious example, the belief that the common acceptance of a communist society would obliterate national and ethnic conflict was exploded at the end of the century, and nationalism was and still is repressed by force all over the world. Remove coercion, and nationalism re-emerges in destructive forms.

But the world since 1945 has seen some positive changes too. Nationalism in Western Europe at least has been transformed by the experiences of the Second World War and the success of cooperation. A sign of better times is the spread of the undefended frontier. Before the Second World War the only undefended frontier between two sovereign nations was the long continental border between Canada and the US. By the closing years of the century all the frontiers between the nations of the European Union were undefended. Today the notion of a war between France and Germany or between Germany and any of its immediate neighbors has become unthinkable; a conflict over the territories they possess is inconceivable, as is a war prompted by the belief that coexistence will not be possible. To that extent the international climate has greatly changed for the better. But the possibility of such wars in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East remains ever present.

As the world moves from the twentieth to the twenty-first century old conflicts are fading and new ones taking shape. Europe, so long a crucible of global conflict, is coming together; war in the West is unthinkable and conflicts with the East have been overcome. In Europe the nation states have voluntarily pooled their national independence, in the economic sphere most completely, and in foreign relations imperfectly. The US has gained the position as the only global military superpower, though this does not give it limitless control. The cold War that dominated so much of the second half of the twentieth century world wide is over, the Soviet Union has normalized its relations with the rest of the world, and the rest of the world with it. But much of the Middle East and Africa remains unreconstructed, in a stage of transition, divided and in conflict.

Unit Six

Narrating World History

In some ways the current generation is making great progress in developing new, more comprehensive, and more intelligible version of world history. It is certainly a major change to find- within the pages of a single textbook or in the curriculum studied by high school and college students- a survey linking the experiences of people all around the globe for the past two thousand or more years. And it is new to have thematic volumes surveying the ecological and technological history of humankind.

At the same time, the underlying elements and structures of world history are those that have been in place for literate populations for hundreds of years. Today's well-informed world historian may read with profit H.G. Wells's *Outline of History*- published over eighty years ago by an energetic journalist and novelist. The prose and conceptualization of Voltaire in his *Philosophy of history*, written a quarter of a millennium ago, remain relevant to the study of world history.

These two sides of world history- novelty and continuity, the new and the old, the expanded and the continued- need to be set in appropriate balance. The tool for striking that balance will almost surely be the historical narrative. Presenting the Past in narrative form, while not unique to the field of History, is nonetheless the most characteristic element of historical studies. The Issue, then, is how best to construct and convey world- historical narratives.

People have been telling stories for many thousands of years, and it is unlikely that the techniques of narrative have advanced much in recent times. To hold the audience, the narrator must offer a problem and a message of interest, presenting a tale that is at once convincing and beguiling. No simple chronicle or list of facts will do. The tale must be conveyed with beauty of word and of image. It must connect the audience to the past and to the topic and characters of the story. It must be an ordered yet not entirely predictable story of a significance that the audience can comprehend. It may relate tales of pain and disaster, yet it must hold somewhere a message of hope. The narrator must introduce an interplay of personality and social forces as well as the mystery of matters beyond human control. The various subplots must sustain their own interest yet converge to make sense of the principal narrative. In short, the narrator faces the challenge of reshaping the story and manipulating the audience, yet leaving that same audience with a memorable impression and with a sense of having taken away a valuable experience.

World historians, seeking to develop their own emphases on transnational connections, often contrast their work with the national studies that now dominate historical research and writing. But professional narratives of national and global history are not the only choices. History existed as a field of study long before it became professionalized, and the professionalization of history has not eliminated the other types of history. Family histories have been told by the aged or by self appointed record keepers, dynastic histories are told by chroniclers, and histories of localities and organizations have been told by boosters and by critics. It was straightforward to organize and comprehend the history of such local groups: the documents were not voluminous, and the perspective was easily selected (though debatable). Writing the history of the nation, that great project of the last century or two, was not so easy. It involved a great deal of abstraction and immense quantities of documentation. National history nevertheless became oversimplified- dangerously so- by imposing a single perspective, and creating a master narrative to trace to path of national destiny. Writing the history of the world is different but not much more difficult. The boundaries are less artificial. The documents are more complex, but our techniques for collecting and analyzing them are improving. The most difficult issue is that of constantly shifting perspective.

How then are world historians to tell their stories? Is a tale of world history told like any other story, or does it have certain distinctive qualities? Now, let us consider how a specific sort of narrative- the narrative of world history- has changed with time.

Who are those who have sought to grasp the history of the world? Why do they assume that the different aspects of the world are connected rather than autonomous from each other? They are people who want to understand their place in the world, but also people who want to change the world. In the latter category, they have included conquerors who desired to control the bodies and loyalties of every person, and religious visionaries who sought comfort and salvation for all human souls. In the former category have been scientists who pursued understanding of the physical heavens and earth, philosophers seeking meaning in all aspects of life, and ordinary persons seeking to find a peaceful place in a complex world. Historians, finally, have sought to tell a tale of the world's past for an audience drawn from the small numbers of persons in these two groups.

Probably most people have wondered about the history of the world at some time in their lives, but it is only in recent times that sizable numbers of people have sought a systematic understanding of world history. Today, in an age of wide literacy and democratic aspirations, the impulse to understand the world – and, in response, to change oneself or the world – has become more broadly based. Even political leaders now encourage, if tentatively, the study of world affairs by the youth in their constituencies.

The problems that world historians have addressed over the ages include the origins and extent of the world and the dynamics of change in the world- in social processes, natural processes, and the interventions of supernatural forces. Over time, knowledge about the world has changed and expanded, and concepts for understanding the world have been reformulated and amplified.

Those who first tried to tell tales of the world had no notion of how far back the world went and no way to be sure about how far the world extended. Myths of origin formalized notions of the world, but those who related myths of origin had to speculate about the actual origin of earth and of society. The myths relied on available grains of evidence to describe the past, but they usually conveyed more about contemporary social values than about historical origins.

Written documents redressed the balance somewhat; Herodotus and Sima Qian used a mix of written documents and oral testimony to take them back a few centuries before their own times, but they had no knowledge of what came before. Just as they had only sketchy knowledge of lands distant from their own. There was no way to choose between those who argued that the world had been created a few thousand years earlier and those who argued that the world had existed almost forever. Eusebius, the early Christian bishop, emphasized depth as much as span and wrote a history of the world attempting to link many different regions through chronology; he also used the chronology of the Old Testament to estimate a date for the creation of the world. IN the work of these and other early authors, their understanding of the world as a whole was limited and flawed, yet they conveyed a sense of context for the histories of their immediate surroundings.

From the time of these early achievements, the basis for understanding world history grew incrementally. With the passage of each year, the known time-perspective of humanity increased. Within that expanding time perspective, the notion of the “other”, the person beyond the home community, remained a major problem in world history. On one hand, geographical distance and social difference encouraged authors to demonize distant ‘others,” endowing them with tails and strange customs, or attributing evil designs to nearby others who were political enemies. Yet every locality included, in its history, the cases of persons who had come from distant places and became locally influential- as with St. Patrick in Ireland and Omani settlers among the Swahili- so that the notion of interaction was built into world history from the beginning. The concept of the “other” thus immediately became complex, including at once the encounter with unfamiliar persons and the negotiation ith those who were familiar but distinctive.

The development of formalized religious traditions surely contributed to the interpretation of world history. For spiritual leaders to think of the fate of all humans, as compared to the gods and the cosmos governing their lives, may raise questions and suggest answers about world history and the interactions of humans with each other. Such global thinking is explicit in the theologies of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, and is evident in most religious traditions. By the end of the first millennium C.E., each of these religious traditions had developed a vision of the world in terms of the relations between god and mankind. Under the influence of such traditions, world

historians of early times focused their efforts not only on summarizing patterns of human action, but also on understanding patterns in natural history (in order to harmonize one's life with them) and on enabling people to align themselves with the desires of the gods- those forces beyond the knowledge or understanding of mankind.

Beginning shortly after 1200 C.E., two great waves of human encounter dominated a period of five centuries; the Mongol conquests across the Eurasian landmass and the European maritime voyages to most of the coasts of the world. The Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century forced direct military, political, and economic connections among people over most of Afro-Eurasia. Ferociously and effectively, the Mongols created an immense political community. While the community itself broke up into successor states within two centuries, the political effects of encounters among these disparate regions remained in the historical memory.

Less significant socially but more significant conceptually, the news of Magellan's voyage of circumnavigating the earth, verifying that it was a globe and demonstrating the place of the continents on its surface, provided new information for everyone. It was not just Europeans who confirmed that the world was spherical, it was literate and informed people every where, of all backgrounds, who could henceforth state with precision the geographical extent and limits of the planet.

These two great efforts to control and understand the affairs of the world reflect a notion of dominance in world history. In every case, however, new encounters and new knowledge showed the limits on human dominance as a strategy for action or as a concept for historical understanding. The Mongols swept all before them in military terms and administered their vast realms with remarkable effectiveness. But the pandemic of bubonic plague, erupting a century after the Mongol conquests and facilitated by the greater social interaction under the pax Mongolia, disrupted political dominance and verified that politics could not command disease. Similarly, while the circumnavigation of the globe gave humans a clear sense of the limits of the earth and the possibilities of dominating global affairs, it was soon followed by the confirmation that the earth was but one small planet in a huge solar system, a humbling realization for any humans humans who sought to dominate.

The efforts at domination and exploration, limited though they were by newly discovered realities, brought a wealth of human encounters in the half-millennium after Chinghiz Khan. People learned of the world by traveling or by observing the impact of external influences on their homeland. The old routes of contact remained the main ones-crossing Eurasia, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, or the African continent, and from point to point within the Americas. But the new maritime routes put people into contact with each other in different ways. African sailors on European vessels, for instance, voyaged not only to Europe and the Americas, but across the Indian Ocean to Japan and across the Pacific between Acapulco and Manila. What they saw and thought we will never know, but we may be felling the results of their voyages even as we read.

The experience of knowing the world was not necessarily pleasant. The new connections initially brought more disaster than development, more oppression than enlightenment. The loss of life with the spread of disease, especially for peoples of the Americas, is the easiest way to tell this tale. The warfare and hostility among newly encountering groups- sometimes at first meeting, and sometimes after a generation's acquaintance-brought great cost I loss of life and creation of new prejudices. Yet people also created family and personal ties across the boundaries. The movement of crops, ideas, and people led ultimately to a more dependable interplay among regions of the world and to a global system that began to expand after overcoming the shock of its creation.

Geographers learned how to comprehend the earth as a physical unit long before historians learned to consider it as a social unit. The notion of encounters with those thought to be previously in isolation from each other drew attention in the debate of Sepulveda and Las Casa about slavery in the Spanish Americas and in contemporaneous struggles along the African coastline. But more important in the long run were the renegotiations of relations among those previously in contact. The fifteenth-century accounts of Ma Huan, the chronicler of the Indian Ocean voyages under the

Chinese admiral Zheng He, convey the modification of existing relationships among peoples more than the opening of new contacts. The relationships among lord and peasant, Han Chinese and Vietnamese, Hindus and Muslims in the Moghul state, rulers of Songhai and Morocco-all these and more were renegotiated in the context of expanding global contacts.

The encounters and renegotiations of this era from the thirteenth through the seventeenth centuries took place not only in social relations but in the natural world and in the human understanding of the supernatural. Humans explored and acclimated themselves to new geographic spaces and climates. Animals and plants, meanwhile, moved as never before from place to place, each struggling for survival with greater or lesser success. And in a world now shown to be changing and changeable, one had to ask whether the changes were the result of supernatural intervention, or whether the gods were allowing the world to work by its own rules. Though they focused clear attention on these several types of encounters, the historical writings of this era tended to treat them in isolation from one another, and were able to link them only in the sense that providence and the will of the supernatural guided the events and processes of the world.

Once the issue of the geographic scope of the world was settled, the issue of social perspective became the most difficult problem in world history. Authors, beginning with their own perspective, found it difficult to acknowledge other perspectives. This, along with limits on their documents, restrained their historical writing to certain segments of the world. Most authors were enclosed within the limits of their region, languages, religion, and social station, the writings of Voltaire-most accessibly in the charming *Candide*- demonstrate an increasing ability of authors in the eighteenth century to acknowledge and articulate a variety of perspectives on history. But the question of perspective, remained unsolved.

Meanwhile, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, historians of the world found themselves able to trace significant change over time, and the labeled that historical change as progress: Progress first in their own knowledge, but also progress in the social order and transformation in the natural world. The developing demonstrations of biological and geological evolution did more than anything else to advance notions of progress in human society.

The problem of the time frame of world history was solved, in general if not in detail, during the nineteenth century. The ambition of philosophers and scientists, as they grew in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, led at once to broader generalization and to a more thorough segmentation and classification of issues in the natural and social world. Linnaeus's classification of plant and animal species set the standard for classification. By the mid-nineteenth century, the classification of animals, plants, and geology had demonstrated that the earth, its geologic features, Plants, and animals had existed for many millions of years, and humanity had existed for perhaps a million years or more. Yet, while the problem of the extent of time had now been solved, the problem of how to break it up remained. Condorcet, updating an earlier Christian tradition, suggested a series of discrete ages, each with its own character. Buddhist philosophy had earlier suggested cycles at the cosmic level, and Ibn Khaldun had suggested dynastic cycles. It would be some time before historians would learn how to address cycles, transformations, trends, and episodes all at once and put them into a coherent narrative.

The problem of social dynamics in world history appeared to become more complex rather than simpler. Bossuet had presented it as the gradual enactment of God's plan, and Hegel would see it as the struggle for expression of the human spirit. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, when they were voraciously reading young philosophers, did as well as anyone in their time at identifying the principle that every element of the world is in change through interaction, at varying rates and because of various conflicts and interactions. Yet the dynamics of world history remained mysterious.

Nineteenth-century analysts of world history sought primarily to address the social issues of their own age. Those issues included the development of new social classes in the wake of economic transformation, the expansion and limiting of slavery, the changing technology and expanding scale of warfare, the complex legal regimes developed to negotiate the social overlaps of expanding empires, and problems of constraint and freedom in commerce and in social

relations. In analyzing these issues, students of broad historical interpretation relied on the social philosophy of the Enlightenment, but they also looked to developments in the natural sciences, particularly the emerging schemes of classification. Out of the classificatory work of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the notion of *civilization* came to be accepted as an all-purpose concept or unit of analysis for world-historical analyses. Nation gained even more approval as the putatively homogeneous community, organized into a state, which would be the basis of further human advance. Class, a statement of social and economic hierarchy, served at once as an elite affirmation of the necessity of hierarchy and as a rallying cry for the toiling masses who sought to eliminate the privilege of wealth. *Race* and *religion*, one assumed to be inherited and the other adopted, were proposed to mark the great divisions in the human community. All of these terms were conveyed as the legacy of nineteenth-century social science, for twentieth-century historians to adopt or discard in their interpretation of the world.

World history consists of studies of the past working from the postulate of connection rather than the postulate of autonomy. In every era, analysis of society have worked from the problems of their age, with the knowledge base of their age, and with available procedures for analysis. The particular approach of world historians has been to address the problems of their era by seeking to establish the context in space and time and locate the constituent elements of each problem. In so doing, world historians have tended to relativize their objects of study. In time world historians seek out the limits of time relevant to any process, then investigate the dynamics of change over time within those limits. In space, world historians locate the widest geographic space relevant to any historical issue, then explore the categories and dynamics of regional interaction. World historians have worked in most detail on the social sphere, focusing especially on politics, warfare, commerce, and the rise and fall of states. The natural world, about which so much has been learned in the past two centuries, has recently become a significant focus of world historical studies. Studies of culture are now undergoing an extraordinary process of development, and the effects of this new knowledge are already beginning to show up in studies of cultural issues at the global level. The relations between mankind and god, between the known and unknown, have been constricted as the power and knowledge of mankind have expanded. Yet the old questions of supernatural forces and human spirituality reappear in new fashions: Comte in his time (and Toynbee a century later) wrote volumes of comprehensive and pragmatic explanation of the world, yet changed in later years to adopt an emphasis on spirituality, in hopes of improving the path of history through an exercise of the will. One can be certain that the issues of religion and spirituality will not disappear from studies of world history.

A world- historical narrative written today has much in common with a narrative written a century ago, in underlying form and technique. Yet new dimensions of the narrative have emerged and will continue to emerge as the task of world history develops and clarifies. To locate the relevant new techniques, historians should look elsewhere in our societies for possibilities, For instance: television soap operas, now popular in many languages, are a rhetorical form allowing for multiple narratives and multiple perspectives, all contained within one tale or at least one program. With the help of this or other devices, historians will learn how to tell a tale that is an envelope of many tales- an overall story but not a simplified one in that it allows the variety of underlying stories to show through. In addition, world historians must learn to convey their theory and analytical perspective at the same time as telling the story or stories. World history can move ahead as a form of analysis and narrative only if the authors and the audiences learn how to adopt and utilize multiple and shifting perspectives. We may also expect, given current changes in technology, that future narratives of world history will be presented in multiple media.

Unit Seven

The ordeal of the Second World War

The second World War was last world war to be fought with conventional weapons and the first to end with the use of the nuclear bomb, which raised the threat that any third world war could end in the destruction of the majority of the human population. The Second World War also became a new kind of total warfare with the deliberate killing of many millions of civilian non-combatants.

The major technical advance was aerial warfare. That cities could be reduced to rubble from the air was first demonstrated by the Germans in Spain in 1937 with the destruction of Guernica. In 1939 it was the turn of Warsaw, and in 1940 of Rotterdam and Coventry. Britain and the US from 1942 to 1945 retaliated with mass bombing of the majority of Germany's cities, with heavy casualties to civilian populations and widespread destruction. The Allied bombing of Dresden, crammed with refugees from the east, just before the war ended has been singled out for particular condemnation. By February 1945 the devastation of German cities no longer affected the outcome of the war. The Germans fought on in desperation. There seemed to be no alternative. Fear, especially of Russian revenge, maintained the resistance. Nor did the devastation prevent the rapid expansion of war production in Germany. Was the great loss of human life justified by the military results? Post-war official Germany estimates that 5093.000 civilians were killed.

Vengeance on the Allied side was a subsidiary motive for the bombing offensive. The lives of more than 50,000 aircrew and an enormous industrial war effort would not have been expended for mere vengeance. Photographic reconnaissance of the destruction of the industrial Ruhr region and other cities seemed at the time to justify these raids as crippling blows against Germany's capacity to wage war. There can be no doubt that German resources were destroyed and wasted in reconstruction and that this weakened Germany's war effort. But more specific strategic bombing of, for instance, synthetic fuel plants and communications was more effective and did severely impede the German war effort from 1944 to 1945. The brilliant German armaments minister, Albert Speer, could no longer make good the losses within the shrinking Reich. Furthermore, before the invasion of France in 1944 the land war waged by the Allies was minor relative to the struggle on the eastern front. The bombing offensive was the only major weapon available to wage a war whose impact would be felt by the Germans until the allied military build up was sufficient to defeat the German armies in the west.

During the Second World War the distinction between combatants and non-combatants was not so much blurred as deliberately ignored. The factory worker was seen as a combatant. In most contemporary eyes, as the war progressed, this justified their destruction and the destruction of their home from the air. Children, women, the old and the sick were killed and maimed in this new type of warfare. The Germans, Japanese and Italians went beyond even what, in the Second World War, came to be considered legitimate warfare against all those involved in the war effort. What would have been in store for Europe, Asia and Africa if Germany and Japan had won the war can be seen from their ruthlessly brutal behaviour as occupying powers. The contrast with the First World War in this respect could not be greater. Murder and terror became deliberate acts of policy.

Hitler's Reich was no respecter of the human values of those regarded as belonging to lesser races, or of the lives of the Germans themselves. The 'euthanasia' programme, for example, was designed to murder 'useless' incurably ill or mentally handicapped German men, women and children. Many thousands of gypsies, classified as 'non-Aryans', were murdered in Auschwitz. Jehovah's Witnesses, whose faith would not allow them to be subservient to Hitler's commands, were persecuted and killed, as were countless other civilians of every nationality who were defined as opponents of the ideals of the regime. Hostages were picked off the streets in the occupied countries and shot in arbitrary multiples for the resistance's killing of German soldiers. Offences against the occupying powers were punishable by death at the discretion of the local military authorities.

Yet, side by side with these horrors, the German armies fighting the Allied Armies in the west behaved conventionally too and took prisoners who were, with some notable exceptions, treated reasonably. In Russia, however, the German army became increasingly involved with the specially formed units attached to the army commands which committed atrocities on a huge scale. Here, there was to be no 'honourably' conducted warfare.

More than 3 million Russian prisoners of war in German hands died through exposure and famine. Himmler, who as head of the SS organization wielded ever-increasing power, later in the war recognized the waste of manpower involved, and Russian prisoners of war and civilians were used as forced labour in German war industries. Many died from exhaustion. On the Allied side, some 300,000 German prisoners of war in Russian hands never returned to Germany. There was also the Soviet murder of Polish officers at Katyn, their bodies discovered by the Germans in mass graves in April 1943. The full horror of this slaughter was only revealed by Russia's new leaders in September 1992. The orders to shoot Polish officers and civilians in prison for suspected enmity to the Soviet Union were signed in March 1940 by Stalin himself and by three Politburo comrades, Voroshilov, Molotov and Mikoyan, at the suggestion of Beria, chief of the secret police. In the forest of Katyn, near Smolensk, 4,421 Polish officers were shot. They were only a proportion of the total victims. Another 17,436 soldiers and civilians were murdered as well. All the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev, were told of the dark secret in the files, which were kept in a special safe. Brezhnev minuted. 'Never to be opened'; Gorbachev passed on some information to the Polish government. The Yeltsin government revealed the full account of the murders.

Japanese troops also became brutalized. To be taken prisoner was regarded as a disgrace. Allied prisoners of war were treated inhumanely by the Japanese military authorities, and thousands of them died. Many were employed together with forced Asian labour on such projects as the construction of the Burma-Siam railway. By the time that death line was completed in October 1943, 100,000 Asians and 16,000 Europeans had lost their lives. In China, the Japanese slaughtered civilians-tens of thousands.

The horrors and ordeals, the depravity and brutality behind the battlefronts, the mass murder of millions are an inseparable part of the history of the Second World War. The atrocities cannot be set aside by the misguided argument that those on one side cancel out those on the other.

In occupied Europe local police could be found to do the dirty work of the Germans for them. In some cases they would have been shot had they disobeyed. In others the work was done with enthusiasm. The public silence of the Pope and the Vatican and of the *German* Protestant churches signifies a massive moral failure. In contrast, in Holland Catholic churches and many Protestant churches read protests from the pulpit after the first Dutch transport of Jews. Priests and pastors wherever Germany held power, suffered martyrdom for their personal protest. Bishop Galen of Munster publicly condemned the murder of some 60,000 to 80,000 feeble-minded and incurably ill Germans in the so-called 'euthanasia' programme but failed to raise his voice for the Jews. Hitler feared that the people's war effort might be undermined by an open onslaught on religious beliefs. A strong public movement by the *German* churches and military, might have saved countless Jewish lives. Hitler and his regime were sensitive to, and watched, the reactions of the German people. There was no such public movement.

The importance and nature of resistance to the Nazis within Germany itself and in Nazi-dominated Europe varied enormously. Conspiratorial by necessity, it came into the open in acts of violent sabotage and several attempts on Hitler's life, the most spectacular- the 20 July 1944 plot- almost succeeding when an explosive charge went off a few feet from Hitler at his headquarters in East Prussia. The composition of the resistance ranged from members of the pre-Nazi Weimar political parties to individuals moved by moral considerations. Thus in Munich a small group of students and teachers who called themselves the White Rose distributed until they were caught and executed, thousands of leaflets condemning the barbarities of the Nazis. But the only resistance that had the power actually to remove Hitler came from within the army and culminated in the bomb plot of 20 July 1944. The officers involved saw clearly that the war was lost and hoped by

removing Hitler to be able to make peace with the western allies while keeping the Russians out of Germany. Others were less materialistically motivated. Had Hitler been killed, the plot might have succeeded, though Britain and America would certainly have refused to make peace on any terms other than unconditional surrender.

Successful armed resistance, tying down considerable numbers of German troops, was carried out by Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia. And in France, while Petain and the Vichy regime enjoyed overwhelming support, a sizeable minority joined the French resistance, undertaking sabotage and supplying a 'secret army' which returned aircrew shot down in France and Belgium on an escape route back to England by way of neutral Spain. In the east, Russian Partisans acted as auxiliaries of the Red Army and interrupted the supply routes of the Wehrmacht. But in occupied Europe there was not one simple struggle against Nazi Germany. Among the resistance fighters themselves there was conflict after the communists joined the resistance after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

The struggle in Yugoslavia between the royalist Colonel Mihailovic and the communist leader, Tito, led to civil war between them as well as war against the Germans. In Poland, the Home Army was as bitterly opposed to the Polish communist partisans as to the common German enemy. Here Stalin had the last word. The Polish government in exile in London, and the Home Army, which took its orders from London, attempted to frustrate or at least impede Stalin's plans to bring Poland under communist control. In August 1944, as the Red Army reached the River Vistula, the Home Army began to rise in Warsaw against the Germans. Their intention was to prove to the world that Poles, not the Russians, had liberated the Polish capital. The Poles seized half the city and fought bitterly for two months until their capitulation to the Germans on 2 October. Warsaw was entirely destroyed. Soviet help was cynically withheld by Stalin. Only during the last stages were Russian supplies dropped; they could only prolong the doomed struggle, resulting in the deaths of still more Polish Home Army fighters holding out in the sewers of the city. The Soviet command had even prevented Polish units fighting with the Red Army from battling their way to the city. Soviet airfields were closed to relief flights from the West. Surrender terms were finally agreed by the Home Army with the Germans on 2 October 1944 and three days later General Bor-Komorowski, with the exhausted remnants of the fighters, gave up the struggle. Surprisingly the Home Army were well treated as prisoners of war, probably in order to increase hatred between the Poles and the Russians.

The Japanese had been at war since 1937. They sought to justify their wars of expansion at home and abroad both as self-defence and as fulfilling a mission of liberating Asia from Western imperialism. In its place Japan would build a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese, to emphasise the solidarity of eastern Asia against the West, chose to call the war they had launched the Greater East Asian War. The real intentions of the Japanese leaders can be deduced from the decisions taken at secret conferences in Tokyo rather than from the rhetoric of their propaganda. First consideration in all the conquered regions was to be given to military needs. Local economies were to be strictly controlled and independence movements discouraged. No industry was to be developed in the southern region, which was to become the empire's source of raw materials and a market for its goods. The Japanese saw themselves as the superior people who possessed the right to subordinate and exploit the conquered peoples. Everywhere propaganda and indoctrination sought to reinforce the superiority of everything Japanese. For the indigenous peoples, foreign Western rule was replaced by more brutal foreign Japanese rule. To compete with America's resources the Japanese mercilessly extorted all they could from the occupied lands.

Even before the war had been launched a secret conference in Tokyo on 20 November 1941 settled the general principle of Japanese occupations. Local administrations were to be utilized as far as possible, but each territory was placed under military government and subordinated to Japan's needs. The Japanese government never worked out any really coherent plan for the future of eastern Asia. Some territories of particular strategic importance, such as Malaya, would remain under direct Japanese control; other, the Philippines and Burma, were promised eventual 'independence' but only if they became cooperative satellite states. Japanese

attempts to win over the mass of Asian people to support the war against their former colonial masters were almost totally a failure. The great majority of the ordinary people did not see the conflict as their war. Equally, there was little active support for the departed Westerners against the Japanese, except in the Philippines. In Burma, and especially in the Philippines, sections of the population became vehemently anti-Japanese. But on the whole the peoples saw themselves as suffering from a war between two foreign masters struggling for ultimate control over them. In India, as has been seen, the political leaders sought to make use of the situation to promote genuine independence.

Of all the peoples under Japanese rule, the Chinese suffered the most—both in China and wherever Chinese communities had settled in south-eastern Asia. In Singapore after its fall, there was a terrible bloodbath of Chinese and at least 5,000 were massacred. Japanese barbarities against the Chinese population, which constituted about a third of the total population of Malaya, drove them into armed resistance. Japanese terror tactics thus proved counterproductive. With the Japanese as masters instead of the Europeans, local administrations continued to function, with the indigenous junior administrators carrying out the orders of their new masters. With the need to fight the war the Japanese left the social order intact and tried to preserve the status quo. To win over the population and channel nationalist feelings, they set up Japanese-controlled mass movements. The constant emphasis on Japanese superiority, however, alienated the local populations.

Some nationalist leaders, because of their popularity, such as Sukarno in Indonesia, were able to gain a degree of genuine independence in return for promising to rally the people to cooperate with the Japanese war effort. More concessions were promised to the Burmese and Filipinos in 1943 as the war began to go badly for the Japanese. In August 1943 Burma was proclaimed independent, but in alliance with Japan and at war with the Allies. In October the Japanese sponsored an independent Philippine republic and in the same month Bose proclaimed a provisional Indian government in exile. In mainland China puppet governments had been set up from the first; Manchuria had been transformed into Manchukuo in 1932 with its own emperor, PU-yi; another Japanese-controlled government of China was set up in Nanking in 1938. But plunder, rape and massacre were routinely perpetrated by the Japanese troops in China. Despite a veneer of local autonomy in some regions under Japanese occupation, the reality of the co-prosperity sphere was not liberation but Japanese domination and imperial exploitation.

In 1942 the Japanese had won large territories in Asia at small cost. The Americans prepared their counter-offensive across the Pacific, straight at the Japanese heartland. This is how Japan was defeated while its armies still occupied the greater part of what had been conquered at the outset of the war. The fall of the Japanese-held island of Saipan, in July 1944, placed American bombers within range of Tokyo. The Americans hoped to bomb the Japanese into submission. The massive raids brought huge destruction on the flimsily constructed Japanese houses. On 10 March 1945 one of the most devastating air raids of the whole war was launched against Tokyo. The fire storm created destroyed close on half the city and caused 125,000 casualties. In May and June 1945 the bomber offensive spread to sixty other major towns throughout Japan.

On 6 August 1945, for the first time, a new weapon was used, the atom bomb that devastated Hiroshima. The destruction and suffering were appalling. Most of the city was destroyed, 66,000 people were killed in an instant and even more succumbed to a new man-made illness, radiation sickness. For decades the atom bomb claimed victims from among the survivors. The casualties from the spring raid on Tokyo by jets of Super-Flying fortresses were greater, but what filled the world with awe and horror was that a single plane dropping just one bomb from out of the blue sky could produce such suffering and destruction. A second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki three days later, again causing great loss of life. In the face of such a war the Japanese surrendered.

The Second World War was waged simultaneously in Asia, Europe and North Africa by huge armed forces on all sides, backed by tanks and aircraft in numbers hitherto unknown and, in its closing stages, with a new weapon releasing the devastating power of nuclear fission. The destruction and maiming on a global scale exceeded anything known before. The war caused not

only many millions of dead and wounded, but also inflicted on millions more forcible population migrations and wholesale destruction of towns and villages- a sum total of virtually unimaginable human misery.

As the tide of the war turned, the German people increasingly suffered the ravages of war. The losses on the eastern front alone matched the bloodbath of the First World War on all fronts. The great majority of the German war dead died fighting in Russia. The bomber commands of the Allies inflicted devastation as city after city was laid to waste during the last months of the war. Above all else, the German people feared the Russians. Benton revenge. Ethnic Germans and German colonizers fled from the advancing Russian armies, retreating into Germany. The Sudeten Germans, who had lived in Czechoslovakia before 1938, were driven out. Most of the Germans living in Polish-occupied eastern German regions from East Prussia to Silesia-assigned to the Poles for administration in compensation for territorial losses to the Soviet Union-were driven out or fled in terror from the Poles and Russians. 'Orderly and humane' population transfers were sanctioned by the Allied Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945. But the mass exodus of 15 million people immediately after the war was certainly not orderly and was frequently inhumane. Pent-up hatreds against the Germans burst out and were vented not only on the guilty supporters of Hitler's regime but also, indiscriminately, on tens of thousands of innocent people, on children and the sick. The exodus from Eastern and central Europe began during the last months of the war and continued after the war was over. Although relatively few were deliberately murdered, in all as many as 2 million Germans are estimated to have died as a result of the privations they suffered.

Mere statistics cannot convey the tragedies that befell almost every family in Europe. The Soviet Union suffered the most: at least 28 million military and civilian people died- a staggering figure. Germany's dead numbered between 4.5 and million. Proportionately to their population, the Jews suffered the most; only a minority of those in Europe at the outbreak of the war survived to its end. For Britain, France and Italy, however, the Second World War casualties did not repeat the bloodbath of the First World War. British military and civilian deaths totaled 4550,000 to which must be added those of the empire; 120,000. The French figures are approximately 450,000 dead; the Italians lost 410,000 dead. Yugoslav, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian losses were heavy. IN central Europe, the Poles suffered far more even than their neighbours. American deaths on the European and Pacific fronts numbered 290,000. No one knows how many million Chinese died in the war; the figure may well be in excess of 10 million; about 2 million Japanese are estimated to have lost their lives in the war. The physical destruction has largely been made good in the years since the war. But the loss of lives will continue to be mourned as long as the generations that experienced the war are still alive. The ordeal of the Second World War also serves as a lasting warning to future generations of what national aggression, evil leaders and the intolerance of peoples can lead to.

Unit Eight

Cultural History

A focus on cultural history gives greater attention to individual human agency than do studies of political, or environmental history. Although people have been limited in their ability to control the ways of the world, they participate. Many cultural expressions of past times were ephemeral and are lost forever, but the remains of others survive in ceramics, burials, words, and habits of dress. In broadest terms, these cultural remains fit into a pattern beginning with many millennia of gradual differentiation in cultural patterns, followed by more recent millennia of cultural convergence. Among early human, localized groups adapted to different ecologies and developed further distinctions in ideas and institutions, while in the last few millennia connections among populations have grown, and technology has been able to overcome ecological distinction.

The elements of cultural history have been studied for a long time, but not with the exception of literature, religion, and intellectual history- in much detail by historians. The recent development of much new evidence for cultural history, especially the development of new perspectives in cultural studies, now enables the field of history to be opened to the full breadth of cultural issues. The dramatic cultural changes of the present day, most insistently in that vast array of media known as popular culture, add significant pressure for a more thorough analysis of cultural issues in society both contemporary and historical. It is entirely possible that a steady advance in the clarity of conceptualization in cultural studies will lead to a flowering in cultural history in the time to come.

The historical profession, which turned in the mid-twentieth century from uniform focus on political history to an exploration of the possibilities of social history, shifted again in the late twentieth century to take up interest in cultural history. The expanded interest in cultural history centered especially on recent centuries, but it extended as well to earlier times. World historians, however, have been relatively slow to take up a substantial focus on cultural issues (as they were slow before to take up social history). The potential for global cultural studies remains nonetheless exciting.

Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn catalogued the anthropological definitions of culture in a 1952 analysis that retains great value. There are many categories of culture under any definition: cuisine within material culture, dance within expressive culture, ideology within reflective culture, and the macro culture of civilization. A further complexity in cultural analysis is that most cultural artifacts are doing double duty. They are representations of human experience and at the same time are utilitarian items. Writing is a technology of communication, but it is also a vehicle for cultural expression. Religion serves at once as expression of spirituality, as means of social control, as statement of philosophy, and as an arena for aesthetic and representational creativity. The days of attempting to analyze music and painting on purely aesthetic criteria are passing rapidly, and the new cultural theories, while seeking to sustain aesthetic analysis, forthrightly link it to social and economic patterns.

The analyst, in addressing these overlapping categories, faces choices on when and how to do cultural analysis. Analysts explore culture through such lenses as the contrasting viewpoints of the creator, the producer, and those who experience the work; culture as artifact, as individual identity, and as synonym for society; culture to emphasize unity or diversity; and global or localized ways of looking at culture.

The narrative of cultural history – the record of changing patterns in human representation and understanding of their world – is not easily summarized. If there is an overall narrative, it might begin with a review of early burial practices and pictorial representations of humans and animals. Early pottery gives a sense of the effort to beautify utilitarian goods, and early sculptures are especially powerful in the visions of social values that they convey. In archaeological remains, cities and stone construction have been most easily located and best preserved. Working from

these relics of past moments of cultural flowering, archaeologists are moving steadily to fill in a picture of the fabric of early human society, so that the term prehistory is beginning to fall into disuse.

New media have been created from time to time, providing new venues for cultural expression. Dress, the most inescapable of cultural forms, changed whenever new materials became available, and also whenever communal fashion or social hierarchy dictated a new look. Music provided a way for each society to reaffirm its heritage, but music changed with the development of new instruments or the production of new sounds from existing instruments. Writing did not create poetic, dramatic, or narrative expression, but it preserved the record of these earlier forms before transforming them; histories and novels supplemented and ultimately displaced epics. With the advent of printing, the market for the written word could expand dramatically, and some languages became standardized. As photography arose in the mid – nineteenth century, the number of images expanded rapidly, but the new images were all in black and white for most of a century until additional technology arose and color returned. The twentieth century has developed such a panoply of new media- and such a range of new relations among artists, audiences, and intermediaries- that it becomes hard to keep up.

Reflective culture works through the social devices for preserving past knowledge, passing it on, and expanding it, for the individual, knowledge expands as one passes through the life cycle; for the society, passing knowledge to the next generation is imperative, and occasionally one is able to add to the fund of knowledge. For millennia, education, philosophy, and religion were all issues of responsibility for the family, until other social institutions became strong enough to remove part of each from the family. Religion remained alive and well in the family, but large-scale, organized religion took over in many parts of the world. Scientific investigation was virtually never done at the level of the family, and required state or other institutional support. Education for daily life remained in the family; villages or ethnic organizations took on education for certain social values, though specialists in priesthood and government received specialized education. The spread of near- universal primary education for literacy during the past two centuries represents a massive reorganization for both family and society.

Historians are used to asking questions on cultural issues that are focused on local or civilizational levels, and they can readily expand their efforts to exploring local aspects of other (anthropological) aspects of culture. For world historians of culture, the issue is to explore interconnections and to find an appropriate balance of local, societal, regional, and global levels of cultural expression. Has human culture developed primarily in site, autonomously emerging among each local grouping? Has it developed mainly through interaction and exchange among group?

Historians of culture will ask about the origins of art from-music, dance, divination- and about the narrative of change and connection in each, as well as the values that each art form reinforces. What sort of periodization and chronology will cultural adopt? Often they have tied art forms and philosophies to the history of states or to religious institutions. Do the patterns of literature have a chronology distinct from that of political regimes? That is, the description of culture artifacts and the chronology of their changes leads to questions about the dynamics of culture production and cultural contact: what sustains traditions over time, and what brings about major innovations?

The products and processes of human creativity, interestingly enough, have value not only for their own time but also for later times. It is in cultural affairs that the term legacy has the greatest resonance. The legacy of the prison colonies structures much of Australian life even today, as the legacy of the Inca state conditions life in the Andes highlands.

The culture patterns and choices of the contemporary world do much to condition our view of the past. The recent development of a powerful and influential set of popular cultural media raises the question of whether popular culture is brand new or has significant antecedents. The current wave of globalization makes it appear that face cultural convergence, with differences disappearing. Are there forces creating differences as well as similarities? The spread of new

media seems to be intensifying cultural experiences. But who exercises most power over the now being created: is it creators, audiences, disseminators, or founders. Our effort to understand these and other current issues in culture will surely lead to innovative studies of the past.

The word culture, in English, has meanings at many levels. It refers to immense social aggregates, such as “Asian culture” or “Islamic culture,” but also to very specific and localized elements of culture, such as a work of sculpture or a village marriage pattern. Scholars have not used such as a work of sculpture or a village marriage pattern. scholars have not used such terms as macro cultural or micro cultural studies to distinguish analyses of culture at these poles, but I suggest that it would be wise to do so. While there is no clear boundary between macro cultural and micro cultural arenas, the logic and the language used at the aggregate end are quite different than at the specific end of what may be a continuum of cultural analysis. Here, I develop the argument for this distinction, focusing on examples of macro cultural and micro cultural analysis in the fields of linguistics and cultural anthropology.

At the aggregate pole, one tends to use the term culture, in the noun form. It refers to a subject or an object at the societal level: inevitably, “French culture.” Culture in this sense serves as identity. In macro studies of culture, one emphasizes distinctions and differences, as between nations and civilizations. At the broad level, these national or civilizational “Cultures” are seen as objects to be classified and identified. Culture as identity, as object, becomes a synonym for society.

In cultural analysis focusing on specifics, the term culture tends to be used in the adjective form, as a modifier rather than as a subject. The emphasis tends instead to fall on the action of creation or of experiencing a creation, especially at the individual level. One focuses on the activity of cultural production rather than on the object produced as a result. In micro studies of culture, one emphasizes linkages and connections, as with links in a creative chain. In the terms I will develop later, “macrocultural” approaches use the “old” definition of culture, while “microcultural” approaches use the “new” definition. As we will see, both microcultural and macrocultural analysis can be carried out the global level.

To begin with microcultural analysis, the terms material culture, expressive culture, and reflective culture each address microcultural issues. They deal with the creation, commissioning, production, dissemination, and experience of culture.

For expressive culture, the art forms include music, dance, literature, and visual art. For material culture the art is supplemental to other social needs, as architecture, dress, cuisine, and many areas of technology. reflective culture, including philosophy, religion, education, and science, carries importance at all social levels but is most easily studied at elite levels. The specifics of microcultural analysis of cultural production and dissemination-lead the observer into unending details, including shapes, sound, colors, textures. And tastes; these specifics also include the logic of colors, and other logics.

Macro cultural analysis begin with broad social distinctions rather than with individual acts of creativity. To begin with, there are societal categorizations: identifying and generalizing about cultural patterns for regions, civilizations, ethnic groups, nations, or religious communities. Within these groupings, macrocultural distinctions have been made among high culture, elite culture, popular culture, mass culture, subculture, and counterculture. In the comparison of national or civilizational cultures, analysis seek to synthesize the many cultural activities, drawing out of them an aesthetic or philosophical essence to sum up the culture in question. Of course the micro approaches and macro approaches to culture are artificial distinctions in the minds of analysts. The actual cultural patterns of society cross the boundaries between the individual and the society, and analysts must find conventions to permit their studies to mirror this reality. One approach, popular among some anthropologists in the early twentieth century, was to define cultural “traits” as the atoms of culture aggregates. It was hoped that each trait could be identified and traced in its contribution to the overall culture of the society in which it was found. Material traits (food crops or housing styles) were to be added up along with expressive traits (patterns of lineage structure) and reflective traits (beliefs in ancestor spirits) to give an overall picture of regional culture.

This approach was repudiated by scholars who noted that no trait could exist in isolation that each trait existed and was defined only in association with other aspects of culture, and that the society itself, rather than existing as a distinct unit, also depended on overlaps and interactions with other societies. If the notion of atomistic traits was too mechanical, there remained the need for a solution to the problem of how to link micro level culture to macro level culture. In practice there are various attempts to make this link. Archaeologists, for instance, do their actual field work in tiny and widely separated excavations, yet generalize from their results to provide interpretations of whole regional cultures. Similarly, architectural historians working with the size and shape of building and art historians working with paintings and murals have been willing to after generalizations on the spirit of an age for all of Rome, or all of East Asia.

The old definition treated “a culture” as an identifiable entity, a “complex whole” of beliefs, of institutions and artifacts. A culture (or an ethnic group or a society) served as the unit of analysis in cultural historical study. Within the framework of this definition, a range of approaches struggled for dominance. That range included, at one limit, analysts treating culture as coherent, bounded, and internally homogeneous (whom we may label as “splitters”) treating culture as a shifting collection of attributes, without sharp boundaries, and containing competing influences, though still susceptible to holistic analysis.

The new definition of culture focuses on the activities of cultural production and transformation. It centers on the struggles and ideas of individuals and groups of people and on the interaction of their contradictory ideas. In these terms, culture is “the semantic space, the field of signs and practices, in which human beings construct and represent themselves and others, and hence their societies and history. The new framework is more explicitly historical than the old. The unit of analysis in this framework is not generally agreed upon by its practitioners, but I label it as the debate: analysis centers on a debate of some social import, and the people and events analyzed are parties and events drawn into resolution of that debate.

The contrast of old and new frameworks in studies of cultural history reflects the philosophical shift from modernism to postmodernism that has pervaded academic debates since about the 1960. The old definition is positivistic: within its framework, and many seek to delineate the elements of culture, the impact of various factors on culture, or the determinants of cultural change. The new definition is postmodern: it focuses on relationships and discourse, not on objects; it emphasizes indeterminacy, not cause-and-effect; it emphasizes change as the rule rather than the exception. Whereas the old framework centers on locating causality; the new framework focuses on identifying contingency. The old framework relies on the social sciences; the new framework displays a revived influence of the humanities.

The adopt the convenient terminology of Thomas kuhn, a paradigmatic shift has occurred. Pressures grew within the old framework, as thinking about culture evolved and developed contradictions. Then innovators such as Clifford Geertz proposed a new paradigm to encompass the field as the old framework burts its limits. 10 More recently the work of John and Jean Coma off has gained recognition as a statement of the new outlook.

The rethinking of cultural history forms but a single facet of the past generation’s metamorphosis in scholarship. The broad changes, as described in part II, include more theory, new philosophies, greater analytical rigor, and interdisciplinary expertise set atop disciplinary specialization. For cultural history, the equivalent scholarly interaction and transformation is unusually complex. Cultural history draws at once on studies in cultural anthropology, linguistics, literature, art, architecture, music, religion, and philosophy. With such a range of disciplines, it is hardly surprising that cultural studies should differ in both empirical content and theoretical orientation from continent to continent, from country to country.

The methods of linguistics, for instance, loom relatively large in cultural history as practiced for Africa, but these methods are diverse and convey a complex heritage. Lexical studies range from simple word lists to the elaborate technique of glottochronology; Structural studies, less numerous, focus on comparative grammar. Various classifications of languages (drawing sometimes on lexical and sometimes on structural data) were central to debates on race, cultural

groupings and migrations. Joseph Greenberg's breakthrough in classifying the genealogy of African languages—so central to our understanding of the Bantu migrations and comparison” of data. More than anything, however, Greenberg relied on lexical comparisons of words and things.

Yet another impact of linguistics has been indirect. Early in the twentieth century the Swiss linguist Saussure developed the notions of “the signifier” and the signified.” Thus introducing formally the consciousness of the speaker as well as the word and the thing. His work became influential beyond the field of linguistics only much later and mainly through the work of French scholars including Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida. But its influence was nonetheless profound, as it sustained new departures in literary theory, cultural anthropology and, generally, the development of postmodernist philosophy.

World historians would benefit from a comprehensive review of the various fields of cultural studies and their interactions, in both past and present. Such a review would assist historians in drawing critically on the evidence and analyses of linguists, anthropologists, art historians, and the many other breeds of cultural analysts. Assembling this review will doubtless require years of research and discussion; in the meantime, we can begin by exploring the evolution of individual fields of cultural study (including, of course, history). At present, the anthropologists have done best in reconsidering their own field, and Adam Kuper has been outstanding among the anthropologists, as has traced the development of the two main threads of anthropological inquiry. In the invention of primitive society(1988) he explores kinship theory from the establishment of its hegemony within anthropology to its virtual collapse in the late twentieth century. In culture: the Anthropological Account(1999) he analyzes the rise of cultural anthropology in the United States, the debates within that tradition, and the interactions with other visions of culture. These volumes trace the preoccupations and transformations in anthropology with a clarity that provides excellent guidance for world historians seeking to draw on the vast anthropological literature.

Clifford Geertz became the most prominent prophet of the turn to the anthropology of culture. His definition of culture as “a set of control mechanisms” is of course quoted. More influential in practice were his expository technique of “thick description,” intended to convey a multiplicity of viewpoints on any set of events, and the particular case of a Balinese cockfight along with the responses of community members when it was broken up by police.¹⁹ The emphasis on thick description may be seen as an attempt to avoid modeling and thereby to sustain consideration of more variables.

The critique of anthropology associated with decolonization resulted, as Kuper has argued, in rejection of the idea of primitive society. In an important contribution to the critique, Johannes Fabian argued that the ethnographic present was not simply an erroneous assumption of social stasis, but an “allochronism,” a device for placing the “other” (the subjects of anthropological study) in to a different time so as not to have to stare the world with them.²⁰ The results of such critique devastated social anthropology, and left cultural anthropology as the main surviving branch of the field.

Yet the paradigm for cultural analysis developed into a rather different from that proposed by Geertz. For not only had decolonization brought a change to the focus and outlook of anthropology, but new analytic devices had come forth, notably the Saussurean linguistics of the signifier and the signified and its more recent variants in philosophy and literary theory. Thus, for the time being, culture is “a historically situated, historically unfolding ensemble of signifiers-in-action, signifiers at once material and symbolic, social and aesthetic.” The term culture in the noun form virtually disappears from the lexicon of those utilizing this new definition, and the adjective from cultural takes its place.

Unit Nine

The Vietnam War and After

Nowhere was human suffering greater in Asia than during the 1960s in the lands of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos . The Vietnam war was a fratricidal conflict between the Vietnamese people . It also marked the climax of the cold war in Asia , which hugely increased the suffering of the indigenous peoples. Because American leaders believed that far more was at stake than just the future of south Vietnam , that the security of the non-communist world was being tested here in the jungles and rice-swamps of Asia , they first supplied money and arms and eventually half a million combat troops in an attempt to help one side in the Vietnamese civil war defeat the other. But America's western allies saw it differently, so Korean war. France and Britain gave advice but sent no troops. In Asia, Australia was the most enthusiastic supporter and, with New Zealand, dispatched several thousand men; other small token allies that sent some troops were Thailand and the Philippines . The Russians and Chinese gave aid and arms to the communists to support their fight but were careful to keep out of combat themselves . The Chinese communists did not want America on their southern frontier ; they had already fought in North Korea to keep the enemy from their northern Manchurian border . It suited the Russians, on the other hand, to see America quagmired in south-east Asia , far away from regions bordering on the soviet union .

The ordinary people, mostly peasants in Vietnam, followed their leaders either through conviction or because they had no choice, con-scripted and coerced into rival armies or units of irregular combatants. In Vietnam resistance was punished by death. Only in a western democracy was public protest possible . Most young Americans accepted their call-up, but there were tens of thousands who did not view the Vietnam conflict as necessary or just and avoided the draft. In the US the war became increasingly unacceptable after 1968, with its heavy losses of American life . with the progressive us disengagement on land , the Vietnamese were left to fight to the finish . The communist forces were the stronger , and they would have won the war between the Vietnamese with less loss of life and destruction had the us not intervened. The Johnson administration failed to grasp the true nature of the conflict it was facing .

The Vietnam war was also a tragedy for the us, for the parents of the 58,200 men killed , for the wives who saw husbands returned in body bags , for the more than 300,000 wounded servicemen whose scars were not only physical. It was a war fought by 19-year-old American conscripts in rice – fields and jungles . The enemy was everywhere and not necessarily recognizable by his uniform . There was nothing to distinguish the Vietcong fighter from unarmed peasants , men , women and even children . In fear of their own lives, the us troops shot first, at anyone who ran away from them or who even looked suspicious; atrocities were committed , villages burnt, innocent and guilty killed . The Americans' south Vietnamese allies had even less regard for the lives of those of their fellow countrymen who were assisting the Vietcong and Vietminh . It was a brutalizing war even by the standards of the twentieth century .

The losses The Americans suffered were small in comparison with those of the Vietnamese people . The scale of death, crippling injury and destruction in Vietnam was so great it is difficult for westerners to grasp how any people could have tenaciously gone on fighting . That was the prime error made by the American generals, who with superior weapons thought they were fighting a war of attrition . since America's goal was not to win a total victory but 'only' to force the North Vietnamese communists to abandon their efforts to occupy the central and southern regions of Vietnam, it seemed to any westerner that a point would be reached when the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would accept that the price of extending their rule over the center and south was too high in human lives and material destruction .

The cruelties of the Vietnam conflict plumbed the depths of human conduct - prisoners were tortured by both sides, and in practice the Geneva convention on warfare counted for nothing . The communist atrocities were largely hidden from western eyes. The freedom of the press in the west , however , ensured that some idea barbarities committed by the south Vietnamese army , and of the effects of American warfare , reached every sitting room .Two images especially etched

themselves on the public eye: the execution of a Vietcong suspect , shot in the head by the chief of police in a street in Hue ; and the spectacle of a naked Vietnamese girl , burnt by napalm dropped from the air and running screaming towards the camera .

The land war in the southern and central regions of Vietnam that formed the Republic of Vietnam was fought in rice-fields and jungle .The Americans ‘punished’ North Vietnam by starting in March 1965 a bombing offensive, codenamed Rolling Thunder , intended to batter its population into the stone Age . More bombs were dropped on North Vietnam than the Americans had dropped during the whole of the second world war . The continuation of war against such , it was believed in Washington , made no rational sense . Vietnam was pitted with bomb craters; large areas of jungle were defoliated by a chemical ‘agent orange’

In an attempt to reveal communist hide-outs . The land was poisoned and so were its people .

Rational? Ho chi-minh and his North Vietnamese politburo were not ‘rational’ when measured by Western moral standards.

Ho chi-minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap were ready to press into the fight as many hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese as might be needed to over whelm the Americans and the South Vietnamese army . ‘Body count’s of Vietnamese did not matter ‘body count’s that mattered were those of the Americans , who sooner or later would have to abandon a war being fought in a far – away country , a war whose outcome was no possible threat to us security . Whether the war lasted ten years or forty, Ho Chi- minh knew that the Americans would not fight for ever. The communists did not have to defeat us forces in the field. This they could not do . But, provided they continued to inflict casualties and just prevented the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies from winning , the us would in the end leave Vietnam. It was a war of attrition. The American people’s threshold of acceptable losses, in an Asian war fought on ideological grounds, was much lower than their enemy’s . For the Vietminh it was a fight to the end to free the south from American imperialism . The death of Ho chi-minh in September 1969 altered nothing – his policies continued to be ruthlessly pursued by his comrades in arms .

The price in blood the Vietnamese paid for their victory was terrible. Vietnam has issued figures starkly revealing the carnage: 1.1 million combatants were killed, 600,000 wounded ; the ARVN (the army of the southern Republic) suffered nearly 250,000 killed and 600,000 wounded;2 million civilians were killed and 2 million injured; thus total casualties reached a staggering 6.5 million , about one in every seven Vietnamese. If the same proportions were applied to the population of the us in 1976,6 million combatants would have been killed, with total civilian and military casualties amounting to 30 million . such statistics bring home to the West the extent of Vietnamese suffering s a result of the war.

Ho chi-minh transformed North Vietnam Vietnam into a rigid communist state by stages. By stages. Until the fighting with the French began, from 1946 to 1949 he played down communism under the slogan ‘Fatherland all’. Having secured much of the countryside by 1950, a new phase began under a fresh slogan, ‘the anti-imperialist fight and the anti-feudal fight are of equal importance’. The ‘land reform’ from 1953 to 1956 was modeled on Mao’s example and ruthlessly eliminated the landlord class, anyone connected with them, and all ‘reactionary elements’ The wave of terror took many lives, and after the 1954 Geneva Conference there was a mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the North to South.

Some of the Vietnamese people were motivated by powerful ideological or religious beliefs. But the majority of the poor peasants would not have chosen to be ruled harshly by the Communist Party in the North or by the succession of corrupt governments in the South. As for the minority-the professionals, the well-off, the army officers, the politicians-they looked after their own interests or supported what they regarded as the lesser evil. Vietnam in contemporary history is the product not of what the mass of its people have chosen, but of half a century of power struggles among the Vietnamese leadership elites within a Cold War framework.

In Washington the creation of the National Liberation Front confirmed the mistaken belief that the conflict was in reality with communist North Vietnam, that there was no Separate, internal South Vietnamese struggle. But, faced with Diem’s embarrassing autocracy and corruption,

disenchantment had set in. Attacks on Buddhist temples organised by Diem's brothers and protest riots in the streets in August 1963 were the last straw, and Washington withdrew its support from Diem and his family coterie. A coup by disgruntled generals was in the making. Henry Cabot Lodge, recently arrived as US ambassador in Saigon, had foreknowledge of it, and his contacts with the generals encouraged them in the belief that Diem's overthrow would be welcome in Washington. On 1 November 1963 the officers went into action and ousted Diem, who fled from the presidential palace. What the Americans had not anticipated was Diem's murder the following day. The junta of feuding army and air force officers governed South Vietnam incompetently. American pressure ensured that some sort of elections were held, but in the war-torn conditions of the republic the military ensured that they retained control.

The Vietcong and Vietminh were getting stronger and gaining support among the peasants by means of terror, indoctrination and persuasion. Confidence in the corrupt South Vietnamese regime was waning. IN the summer of 1965 the Americanisation of the war began. Within three years more than half a million young American combatants were fighting in Vietnam, and thousands had died. American generals more or less took over the war. In 1967, by counting all the communists they killed in hundreds of skirmishes in rice-fields and forests and in attacks on villages by day which supplied the Vietcong by night, they thought they were surely winning the war. But these missions to seek out and kill the enemy did not bring the conflict to an end. American tactics proved of no avail in the jungles of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. A helicopter gunship was not as effective as tens of thousands of Vietcong and Vietminh, each armed with a rifle and able to live on a daily bowl of rice. It was impossible to kill them all. Casualties would be replaced with new recruits, increases in American combat troops with increased numbers of Vietminh. The Vietcong controlled much of the southern countryside.

The North Vietnamese were certainly encouraged by the growing protest movement against the war in the US and by their success in undermining the authority of the South Vietnamese regime. They calculated that an American withdrawal would be hastened if they showed a readiness to talk peace while continuing to inflict heavy casualties on Americans in Vietnam: a point would be reached when American public opinion would force the administration to accept the communist peace terms in all essentials. Nixon's policy of Vietnamisation played into their hands as they negotiated interminably in Paris. Their prime aim was to reach an agreement that would get the US out but would leave them able to continue the war within the country until final victory. So they resolutely rejected any proposal put forward by Henry Kissinger, America's chief negotiator in Paris which required both North Vietnamese forces and the Americans to withdraw from the South. American bombing caused grievous losses but, making use of widely dispersed factories and with supplies of arms from China and Russia, the communist leadership in Hanoi was prepared to continue waging war for years to come.

In January 1973 a ceasefire was finally agreed. The Americans would withdraw from Vietnam within sixty days and the settlement would be left to the Vietnamese. But the ceasefire was not a prelude to peace. The North Vietnamese soon resumed the conflict and, despite massive supplies of American arms, the badly led South Vietnamese army crumbled completely. The Watergate scandal had removed Nixon in August 1974, and his successor President Ford knew only too well that the American people would not sanction a renewed US involvement in the war. As the North Vietnamese army thrust south, millions of refugees fled in terror towards Saigon, but the capital itself fell on 30 April 1975 as the last Americans and accompanying Vietnamese were lifted from an American safe house in a frenzied evacuation, seventy helicopters carrying 1,000 people to safety on the US warships lying offshore. But hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese officers and civil servants who had been loyal to the American-backed South Vietnamese regime were left behind to face the rigours of 're-education' by their new masters. They were taken to camps, where some spent months and others years, a Vietnamese Gulag.

The communists now applied their Marxist, centrally directed economic policies in the south and imposed a one-party state. They set out to abolish capitalism and collectivise land, with disastrous results. The people suffered once again from the corruption of officials and the

incompetence of the administration. During the 1980s more market-oriented economic policies were introduced, permitting entrepreneurs, especially in the south, to run small factories and services for profit. Within the top echelon of the party there was a constant struggle between the reformers, the pragmatists who wanted to follow China's example, and the party ideologues, who believed that these experiments weakened Marxism-Leninism. The conflict was principally about the correct economic policies in order to raise Vietnam's low standards of living, which in bad years led to widespread malnutrition. But there was no thought of turning the one-party state into a multi-party democracy. Economic liberalization won the upper hand in the second half of the 1980s, but bad state management of the economy led to hyperinflation checked periodically by austerity measures. Attempts to attract foreign investment had little success. With the outbreak of revolution in Eastern Europe and Soviet *perestroika*, Vietnam's political control tightened once more in 1989 and 1990. Vietnam remains one of the poorest countries in the world, barely able to feed its rapidly expanding population, which reached 66 million in 1989.

Vietnam remained isolated until the early 1990s, and no large-scale international aid or capital investment had reached it. A people who had suffered so much deserved a better fate, and there were increasing signs that the US felt it had a moral responsibility to help. By the mid-1990s Vietnam's isolation from the West was ended: in 1994 the US lifted its trade embargo and a year later normalized relations. Vietnam continued to be ruled by an elderly Marxist Politburo, veterans of the war, like the party general secretary Do Muoi, aged eighty in 1996. The door was nevertheless opened slightly to Western 'capitalist' investment. With 80 per cent of the people living in the countryside, the limited impact made itself felt principally in the cities. The cultural attraction of the West, however, proved strong for the younger generation born since the war. Tension is inevitable. Given the regulation and bureaucracy of the regime and their opposition to the imports of Western culture, the new millennium was reached before Vietnam had the opportunity to emerge from its backward economic state. Western influence could not be kept out. Vietnam became a popular tourist destination early in the twenty-first century. What is extraordinary is the friendliness the Western visitors now encounter. The absence of hatred bodes better for the future.

Unit Ten

Political and Economic History

Studies in political and economic history have provided the backbone of world history since early times and continue as the largest sub-fields in world history. Political history addresses government, political conflict, and change, while economic history addresses the production of goods and services, the demand for goods and services, and their exchange through commerce, redistribution, or other processes. Politics operates through the structures of local political communities and the larger units known as states including monarchies, empires, and nations; the institutions of economics have been households, mercantile firms, productive firms, and the states that have regulated economic life. The political questions of representation, administration, diplomacy, and war are in many ways distinct from the economic issues of land, labor, capital, money, and economic growth. Yet these two sub-fields of history overlap significantly because of the importance of government policies in determining economic outcomes, and because economic conditions often set the parameters for political communities. The discussions of research agenda, review the most basic and most pressing questions about the past, in the minds of observers ranging from historians (both professional and amateur) to the general public. In simple terms, one asks, what do we need to know about the global past? More precisely the research agenda, based on what is known of the past for a given field of history, consists of the questions of historians and the questions of the public about that field. Historical questions emerging out of public discourse usually result from the dilemmas and problems posed by the current social situation. Thus the wave of democratization movements beginning in 1989 brought in its wake a smaller wave of studies of democracy in history. Questions of historians, in contrast, are more likely to result from problems in the past; debates about historical processes or contradictions between research results are what cause historians to pose new questions for research. For instance, since it was realized that most silver mined in the seventeenth century was sold in China and elsewhere in Asia, was it implied that Asia economies were growing rather than stagnating in that era?

The questions that make up the research agenda, depend on what is known about the past as well as what is not known. That is, a narrative of political and economic history provides the basis on which new questions are posed. The most prominent narrative in world history is its long-term political narrative—that is, the formation of early states, the development of empires, the periodic rise and fall of imperial systems in different areas of the world, and the succession of dominant powers up to the present. A related narrative recounts the evolving technology and social organization of warfare, with the result that advances in warfare facilitated the expansion of great states. A distinct political narrative traces the changing institutions of government and the social classes or interests that dominated government; of particular interest has been the expansion of representative government.

The leading global economic history narrative portrays the expansion of systems of long-distance trade, as they interacted with centers of production and of wealth. In this narrative, attention has focused on the major trade goods and on systems of money. But of nearly equal importance has been the study of different systems of production, focusing on the use of labor and particularly on the role of peasants, artisans, slaves, and wage workers in production. For recent centuries it has been possible to trace levels of aggregate output and wealth for national economic units and to observe the growing inequality between rich and poor nations.

The questions of historians can often be categorized, into questions about the origins, the timing, the dynamics, and the legacy of past historical phenomena. (It is helpful, in addition, to break the “dynamics” of the past into the functioning of historical systems, the connections among systems, and the transformations of systems.) For the origins of political and economic systems, historians’ questions focus not only on the initial creation of states and markets but on creation of new stages in history.

The origins of capitalism and of industrial production are thus among the most hotly debated historical questions, as are the origins of nations. What were the origins of the commercial systems of the Mediterranean, of the Silk Road, the Indian Ocean, and (later) the Atlantic and Pacific? What were the factors promoting growth, decline, or transformation in the economic or political systems?

For timing, one can ask when a world economic system came into being, and when a world political system came into being. In the functioning of political and economic institutions, historians have inquired into the workings of imperial governments and systems of long-distance trade. (Analyses of constitutional systems and trade diasporas may be seen as attempts to answer these questions.) How did trans-Saharan trading systems function for 1,500 years? For connections in political and economic history, historians have asked about the spread in types of government (such as Persian traditions of government) and about the way in which commerce in such stimulants as tea and coffee linked commercial systems around the world.

In posing questions about the transformation of political and economic systems, historians have asked about the rise and decline of modern slavery, the emergence of electric power, and the transformations of empires into nations or nations into empires. Sometime the questions are about frameworks of analysis: should political and economic systems be explained in terms of the dominance of their central power or in terms of interconnections of constituent pieces? In politics, theses tend to focus on dominance and cataclysmic change in the history of states. Wars, for instance, come as a shock to the global system, as indicated in the aftermath of World War I, World War II, the Napoleonic wars, and the Mongol conquests. In economics the analysis is more likely to center on evolutionary change. What has been the balance of dominance and interconnection in the operation of global economic systems?

The legacies of Greek democracy and of Roman laws for the modern world are often invoked, the first providing an inspiration and the second providing principles and procedures still in use. The legacy of the Mandate of Heaven provided successive dynasties with rationale for continued power and gave opponents a principle for overthrowing ineffective rulers. The legacy of the founding caliphs offered the Islamic world a model for piety and effective government. For economic affairs, the notion of legacy is less commonly employed, though one could think of African railway systems as a legacy of the colonial era.

In addition to these questions about the past arising from the historical record itself, the concerns of the present day provoke important questions about the political and economic history of the past. The state is seen today by some as the protector of social welfare for its citizens, but in other perspectives the state is seen as a source of oppression for some of its population; have states become more or less oppressive with time? For much of the twentieth century, the world experienced a competition between capitalist and socialist socioeconomic systems: what precedents were there for this struggle, and what legacy has been passed on from that struggle? Is corruption in public life becoming more serious: What precedent is there for democratic political institutions? What fates have previous states brought to small political communities, such as indigenous peoples? Will states bring employment and education to all citizens?

Having demonstrated that the questions are many but that they arise logically from existing knowledge and current problems in political and economic affairs, let us now consider the results of recent research in these two fields.

When did political history begin? Only when sizable political units emerged, according to the usual argument. These were monarchies that were themselves based on the localized institutions of government that preceded them by perhaps thousands of years. The analysis of this early stage of political history depends on the collaboration of historians and anthropologists.

Political history focuses overwhelmingly but not entirely on the state. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall, in their macrohistorical studies of human societies, identify politics as one of several levels of large-scale organization. As they present it, the scale of politics and government exceeds that of production and exchange of foodstuffs, but long-distance trade takes

place at a scale beyond that of politics and government. Their analysis of expansion and contraction of political systems set government in the context of a wider range of social processes.

Michael Mann proposes a history and theory of power relations, addressing power from early states to 1914 in the first two of a projected four volumes. He defines societies as “constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting Sociospatial networks of power,” and focuses on ideological, economic, military, and political sources of power. His narrative of power, however, seems to respect well-known boundaries of societies. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall set the same political systems in world-system perspective, emphasizing a similar but wider range of power relations through spatial and graphical portrayal. Quite a different theory of power is that of Michel Foucault, who focuses on fields of power relations. It may not be possible to unify or generalize theories of power, but the various approaches should be placed in contact with one another.

The documentation of rise and fall in world political history can lead one not only into the chronicles of creating and eliminating great states but into the changing institutions and practices of governments over time. The anthropologist Bruce Trigger, in an innovative, cross-sectional approach to what he calls “early civilizations,” has compared seven societies by type of government; territorial states (Egypt, North China under Shang and Western Chou dynasties, and Inca). And city-state systems (Mesopotamia, Mexico, Maya, and Youruba). He emphasizes that both models of political structure have been applied across the millennia and that each has characteristic benefits.

The notion of the monarchy has arisen so often that the idea of kingship may seem unproblematic, but the differences in types of kingship show monarchy to be worthy of detailed scrutiny. Is the monarch selected by heredity, individual accomplishment, or consensus among contending social institutions? What, further, is the history of political advisers? Informal advisers at one level are followed by formally appointed ministers. Still other institutions of government include courts, legislatures, laws, diplomats, armies, provincial governments, tribute, taxation, and public works. Writing a global history of developing political institutions is no easy matter. It has been attempted within civilizational context, as for Europe, for China, Japan, and the Islamic world. But to expand the frame of analysis and trace the development and revision of governmental institutions across civilizational lines will be a complex task. One might compare this possibility with the work that has already been attempted in military history. Because of available documentation, military historians have tended to restrict themselves to analysis of the great powers. Within those limits, however, military historians have made courageous efforts to analyze military technology and institutions at a global level.

World history, in politics, tends commonly to be explored at the regional level. One advantage to this approach is that it focuses attention on the common institutions of the various regional political systems. Regional networks of political systems may be identified on a large and small scale throughout the world, as successful innovations spread by conquest or imitation to neighbors. The Chinese system of politics is the largest and most durable, with its ideological rationalization in the Mandate of Heaven. The system of administration through scholar gentry spread along with the frontiers of the empire, but other institutions and titles of Chinese inspiration spread to many parts of eastern Asia. Persian practices and symbols of government, developed especially in the Achaemenid period, maintained significance in the surrounding Caucasus, Central Asia, and North India well into the second millennium. Over the same time period, the political tradition of Mesoamerica underwent progressive development, though under a variety of regimes. The institutions of the Islamic caliphate, assembled initially by founders of the regime in Media and Damascus, provided governmental systems that lasted into the twentieth century and court systems that operate today.

In the language that has come to be used in recent centuries, all of these governmental systems had constitutions in that they tended to work by certain regular political principles. The practice of writing and legislating constitutions began in the eighteenth century, and now most

people are governed by states with written constitutions that can be traced directly to those of the eighteenth century.

For the twentieth century, the issue of democracy-meaning political representation and participation by the majority of the population- has come to be an essential topic in politics. Consent of the governed appeared to be a less significant issue for large political units in earlier times, yet at local levels some sort of consensus was necessary for a governing authority to maintain power. For this reason the issue of democracy is of interest in human history over the long term: while one cannot simply project the current vision of democracy back into earlier times, one may seek to reconstruct the degree of participation and consensus of the governed in political affairs at local levels as well as in the state overall.

Perhaps because the traditions of political history focus so firmly on nations and empires, one is hard pressed to find political studies reaching beyond individual states and their interactions. World historians have not relied much on the anthropological and political science literatures, with their emphasis on local government, representative institutions, and constitutional principles. It would be a step forward to have more world-historical studies addressing these issues, linking patterns of local, national, and imperial government and tracing long-term persistence and transformation of governmental institutions and principles.

Political and economic history have provided the strength of world history. The recently completed work and the new questions it raises suggest that much more can be done. These studies correspond to work along the historians' path to world history in which new perspectives and new data are developing a much broader and more interconnected picture of global political and economic history. In economic history, scholars are showing considerable originality in developing data and comparative perspectives relevant to the issues; nonetheless, the difficulty of developing data on comparable regions for transnational comparisons remains a major hindrance. For politics, much new research has been framed at a broad level, and we await further analysis and debate that will clarify larger-scale and longer-term patterns.

For recent times, I think it is a priority for historians to trace and interpret the rise of international organizations, as one may plausibly argue that they represent the most pervasive and dramatic change in political and economic orders within the past century. For earlier times, I think it is equally important to clarify the patterns and dynamics of empires, including their interactions with each other and with smaller political communities. For both economics and politics, we need to get beyond historians' habitual focus on the most apparently dominant elements, to study interactions of a wider range of elements.